|
All general elections in Scotland are interesting. Despite the fact
that Labour has been the dominant party since the 1960s, the country
has developed a complicated four-party system that gives rise to different
forms of party competition in different constituencies. The Scottish
National Party (SNP) became Labour's principal opponent in the 1970s;
geographical concentrations of support have enabled the Liberal Democrats
to win significant numbers of seats in recent elections; the Conservative
party has been relegated almost to'fringe' status but persists. In 2005,
however, the general election in Scotland was even more interesting than
usual because it was fought on very substantially revised constituency
boundaries.
In the past, electorates in Scottish constituencies have been significantly
smaller than those in English seats. In 2001, for example, English constituencies
averaged almost 70,000 electors compared with just over 55,000 in Scottish
constituencies. As part of the deal that brought about the establishing
of the Scottish Parliament in the late 1990s, it was agreed that Scottish
Westminster constituencies should be brought more into line as soon as
possible. Achieving this necessitated major changes to boundaries. The
number of constituencies was reduced from 72 to 59 and only three seats
survived unscathed - East Renfrewshire (formerly Eastwood), Orkney and
Shetland and Na h-Eileanan An Iar (formerly Western Isles). Only two
had relatively minor changes to their boundaries (West Aberdeenshire
and Kincardine, and North East Fife). The remaining 54 changed very significantly
and in many cases out of all recognition as compared with the old constituencies.
In order to allow analysis of electoral change at constituency level,'notional'
2001 votes for the parties in the new constituencies were calculated
and published (see Denver, Rallings and Thrasher 2004). The intention
was to produce estimates of how the votes cast for the different parties
in 2001 would have been distributed in the new constituencies. Calculating
these estimates is not straightforward, however. It has to be assumed
that everyone would have voted in the new constituencies exactly as they
did in the old, since it is actual 2001 votes that have to be redistributed.
It is plain, however, that in many cases, electors would not have
voted in the same way had the new boundaries been in place because the
tactical situation would have been different. In addition, since local
council wards form the building blocks of constituencies and general
election votes in wards are not available, local election results have
to be used to estimate the electoral effects of different areas moving
between constituencies. There are numerous difficulties in extrapolating
from local to general elections, however, the most obvious being that
the major parties do not contest all wards.
As a preliminary to analysing the 2005 results, therefore, it is worth
attempting to assess how realistic the 2001'notional' votes were. Table
1 shows first the standard deviations (which measure spread) of changes
in the parties' vote shares across constituencies from the 2001 estimates
to the 2005 result and compares these with changes between 1997 and 2001
(when constituencies stayed the same). The figures are encouraging since
they are of the same order in the two cases. Secondly, on the assumption
that there were relatively similar movements across Scotland between
2001 and 2005 we would expect strong correlations between each party's
estimated vote share in the new constituencies in 2001 and its actual
share in 2005. As the data in the table show, the correlations are indeed
very strong and the coefficients are very similar in size to those measuring
the similarity in patterns of support between 1997 and 2001.
Nonetheless, there were a few constituencies where a party's 2005 vote
share was significantly smaller or larger than would have been predicted
on the basis of the 2001 estimates. These are listed in Table 5 (below)
and most can be easily explained. Overall, then, the 2001'notional' vote
distributions in constituencies do not seem unreasonable. Indeed, it
is worth noting that Na h-Eileanan An Iar produced an unexpectedly bad
performances by Labour and the Conservatives and an unexpectedly good
one by the SNP while in Orkney and Shetland the Conservatives had a particularly
poor result. In both cases there was no change in boundaries at all.
Table 1: Comparing change in parties' shares of votes across constituencies
1997-2001 and 2001-05
|
1997-2001
|
2001-5
|
Standard deviations of changes in share
|
|
Conservative
|
2.7
|
2.8
|
Labour
|
4.2
|
3.4
|
Liberal Democrat
|
3.5
|
4.1
|
SNP
|
3.8
|
3.6
|
Correlations between vote shares
|
|
Conservative
|
0.946
|
0.938
|
Labour
|
0.976
|
0.973
|
Liberal Democrat
|
0.961
|
0.949
|
SNP
|
0.915
|
0.930
|
Note: The Speaker's seat is excluded from all calculations.
The National Result
Table 2 shows the outcome of the election in Scotland. Turnout rose
by about the same amount as it did in Britain as a whole and it seems
likely that this was a consequence of the fact that, whereas in 2001
Labour was expected to win easily (and a landslide duly transpired),
the polls during the 2005 campaign consistently reported that - at least
in terms of votes - the result would be much closer this time. In addition,
for a variety of reasons, there may have been an increased determination
to vote against the government on the part of some voters.
As elsewhere, the Conservatives had a very small increase in terms of
popular support (+0.2 percentage points) but remained firmly in fourth
place in Scotland. Nonetheless they retained a toe-hold on representation
by gaining a seat (Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale) that was
notionally Labour in 2001. The increase in the Liberal Democrat share
of the votes (+6.3) was larger than in England and Wales (+3.6) and took
them into second place in Scotland. In addition to holding all the seats
assigned to them in the 2001 estimates, the Liberal Democrats added East
Dunbartonshire and Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey, taken from
Labour. The SNP dropped back in terms of vote share but added two seats
to their 2001 notional total - Na h-Eileanan An Iar and Dundee East -
both formerly Labour seats. So Labour lost five seats in all as a consequence
of a sharp decline (-4.4) in vote share, even although this was a less
sharp drop than Labour experienced in the rest of Britain (-5.9). Nonetheless,
the operation of the first-past-the-post electoral system ensured that
Labour remains heavily over-represented. With just 39% of the votes,
the party took 68% of the seats.
Table 2: Share of Votes and Number of Seats Won and Changes from 2001
|
Share of votes (%)
|
Change
2001-5
|
Number of seats
|
Change
2001-5
|
Conservative
|
15.8
|
+0.2
|
1
|
+1
|
Labour
|
39.5
|
-4.4
|
40
|
-5
|
Liberal Democrat
|
22.6
|
+6.3
|
11
|
+2
|
SNP
|
17.7
|
-2.4
|
6
|
+2
|
SSP
|
1.9
|
-1.2
|
-
|
-
|
Other
|
3.1
|
+1.5
|
1
|
0
|
Turnout
|
60.6
|
+2.5
|
|
|
Note. The Speaker, who was not opposed by the Conservatives or Liberal
Democrats in Glasgow North East, is treated as an'other'. The change
in the number of seats is from the'notional' 2001 results.
The most successful of the small parties was the Scottish Socialist
Party (SSP) with 1.9% of the votes but this was well down on its 2001
share (3.1%). The Green party's 19 candidates got 1.1% of the votes but
outpolled the SSP in every constituency (18) where both stood. UKIP,
with 22 candidates, made little impression.
Turnout: Constituency Variations
There is little doubt that turnout increased across the board. Even
using 2001 estimates - which are liable to error - increases were recorded
in 50 constituencies and only marginal decreases in nine. The biggest
increase was in East Dunbartonshire (+10.1) which had been transformed
into something approaching a three-way marginal and which provides evidence
that the electorate noticed - or were informed by the parties about -
how the electoral status of some seats had changed. Overall, there was
a significant positive correlation (+0.268) between the marginality of
constituencies according to the 2001 estimates and the change in turnout.
The more marginal the seat, the more turnout increased.
In advance of the election, Labour campaigners feared that some of their
supporters might vent their displeasure with the government - especially
over Iraq - by not turning out to vote but the aggregate turnout data
suggest that these fears were not realised either in Scotland or in the
rest of country. Even in Labour's safest Scottish seats (majority over
30%) turnout was up by 1.9% on average (N = 21). There was a slight tendency
for turnout to increase more the stronger the Conservatives were in a
constituency in 2001 but for the other parties there was no significant
association between their previous strength and turnout change. There
is also no evidence that any of the major parties was particularly harmed
or advantaged by the changes in turnout. In each case the correlation
coefficient measuring the association between turnout change and change
in a party's vote share fails to reach statistical significance.
Turning to actual turnout in 2005, we encounter a much more predictable
and familiar pattern of variation across Scottish constituencies (see
Denver and Hands 2004). The lowest turnout was in Glasgow Central (43.8%)
- and the next four lowest were also in Glasgow seats - while East Dunbartonshire
and East Renfrewshire shared the top spot, both recording 72.1%.
The general pattern of constituency variations in turnout is most effectively
described by correlation coefficients which measure the strength of association
between turnout and variables indicating the socio-economic characteristics
of constituencies and the electoral context. This is done in Table 3.
The socioeconomic variables are derived from the 2001 census and they
are all (except % private renters) significantly related to turnout.
Turnout was higher in constituencies with more professional and managerial
households, owner occupiers, people aged 65 and over, people employed
in agriculture, people with degrees and Church of Scotland adherents.
Turnout was lower the more manual workers, social renters (from the council
or a housing association), young voters, persons per hectare, people
from ethnic minorities, households without a car and Roman Catholics.
In general, then, - and it is nothing new - turnout was higher in more
affluent and rural areas and lower in poorer and more urban areas. Like
Britain as a whole, Scotland is divided into relatively low turnout and
relatively high turnout constituencies and the two are very different
in social terms.
Table 3: Bivariate correlations between turnout in 2005 and constituency
characteristics
% Professional & Managerial
|
0.612
|
% In agriculture
|
0.263
|
% Manual Workers
|
-0.649
|
Persons per hectare
|
-0.423
|
% Owner occupiers
|
0.789
|
% Ethnic minority
|
-0.344
|
% Social renters
|
-0.737
|
% With degrees
|
0.443
|
% Private renters
|
-0.033*
|
% With no car
|
-0.666
|
% Aged 18-24
|
-0.356
|
% Church of Scotland
|
0.474
|
% Aged 65+
|
0.299
|
% Roman Catholic
|
-0.387
|
|
|
Constit marginality 01
|
0.582
|
|
|
Minor party vote 05
|
-0.555
|
Notes: All coefficients are statistically significant except the
one asterisked. Glasgow North East (Speaker's seat) is excluded from
all calculations (N=58).
The closeness of the contest in a constituency in the previous election
(marginality) is also regularly associated with turnout levels. Parties
put greater campaign efforts into more marginal seats (and, these days,
virtually ignore those that are either very safe or hopeless for the
party concerned) and unsurprisingly these efforts bear fruit in higher
turnouts. The 2005 election was no exception. Although the previous marginality
of Scottish seats could only be estimated it was strongly related to
turnout. On the other hand, while it might be thought that the larger
the array of candidates that are available the more people would be inclined
to vote (since it would be more difficult to use the excuse that there
is no-one to vote for) the better ‘'others' (including the SSP)
did in a constituency, the lower was turnout.
While bivariate correlations are interesting and important in themselves,
they constitute only a first step in analysis. One problem in interpreting
them is that the various measures of the social composition of constituencies
are themselves highly inter-correlated. Thus, areas in which a large
proportion of households are owner occupiers tend also to have large
proportions of professional and managerial workers and small proportions
of social renters. Secondly, bivariate analysis provides no clue as to
the joint impact of a number of variables or to the impact of any single
variable once others are taken into account. Thus, we might want to know
how much of the variation in turnout is explained by class and housing
tenure together or whether constituency marginality affects turnout once
the class composition of the constituency is taken into account.
We can begin to deal with these problems by undertaking multiple regression
analysis. This enables us to sort out which variables are the most important
influences on turnout, see whether a particular variable remains significant
when all others are held constant and evaluate how successfully combinations
of variables explain turnout variations. The results of a stepwise regression
involving the socio-demographic variables and marginality show that just
four variables (the percentages of owner occupiers, those aged 65 and
over, manual workers and those belonging to an ethnic minority) account
for 77% of the variation in constituency turnouts across Scotland. Each
of these has an independent effect on turnout even when scores on the
other three are taken into account. It should be emphasised, however,
that this does not necessarily mean that the groups mentioned were more
or less likely to vote. It is the characteristics of constituencies that
is being analysed here, not the behaviour of individuals or groups.
Patterns of Party Support
Changes in party support from 2001 to 2005 were not uniform across Scotland.
Table 4 groups constituencies into cities and regions (in order to minimise
any errors that may have been made in calculating notional votes in individual
constituencies). Labour declined everywhere (although by varying amounts)
except in the three South of Scotland constituencies. This was also the
only region in which there was a fall in Liberal Democrat support and
a significant increase in votes for the Conservatives and it also saw
the biggest SNP decline. All of these unusual figures for the South of
Scotland can be explained by the new tactical situations in Dumfries
and Galloway and Dumfriesshire and also the Liberal Democrat slump in
Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk (probably caused by the retirement
of the long-time Liberal Democrat incumbent, Archie Kirkwood). Otherwise,
the SNP managed to increase its vote share, against the national trend,
in North East Scotland and Dundee while the Liberal Democrat increase
in Dunbartonshire (mainly due to the performance of the youngest candidate
to be elected, Jo Swinson, in East Dunbartonshire) was dramatic.
Table 4: Changes in vote shares of major parties in cities and regions
2001-5
|
Conservative
|
Labour
|
Liberal Democrat
|
SNP
|
Aberdeen (2)
|
-1.8
|
-4.1
|
+8.4
|
-3.1
|
Dundee (2)
|
-1.6
|
-3.4
|
+3.9
|
+1.7
|
Glasgow (6)
|
+0.1
|
-4.8
|
+7.3
|
-3.1
|
Edinburgh (5)
|
-1.0
|
-7.1
|
+8.9
|
-2.3
|
Highlands and Islands (6)
|
-2.0
|
-3.8
|
+9.1
|
-5.1
|
North East Scotland (4)
|
-1.7
|
-1.3
|
+2.8
|
+4.9
|
Perthshire and Angus (3)
|
+1.1
|
-2.9
|
+3.2
|
-1.3
|
Fife (4)
|
-0.7
|
-4.0
|
+4.6
|
-1.0
|
Falkirk and Lothians (5)
|
+1.2
|
-4.7
|
+7.2
|
-1.9
|
Stirling & Dunbartonshire (3)
|
-0.5
|
-7.2
|
+12.9
|
-5.7
|
Lanarkshire (7)
|
+1.1
|
-3.4
|
+6.2
|
-3.4
|
Renfrewshire (4)
|
+0.3
|
-3.6
|
+5.1
|
-1.0
|
Ayrshire (4)
|
-0.9
|
-5.3
|
+6.9
|
-0.8
|
South of Scotland (3)
|
+6.9
|
+1.4
|
-2.0
|
-7.3
|
Note: Glasgow North East is excluded from the calculations for Glasgow.
Changes in party support were even more variable at constituency level.
Indeed, as compared with the 2001 estimates all the major parties managed
to increase their vote share in some seats while losing support in others.
The Conservatives were down in 31 seats, up in 25 and stayed at exactly
the same level in two. That is not perhaps surprising given the very
small change in their overall vote share but Labour had an improved performance
over 2001 in five seats and the SNP in ten while the Liberal Democrats
lost ground in five constituencies.
The best and worst performances by each of the parties can be easily
identified by a series of simple regression analyses predicting each
party's vote share in each constituency on the basis of its estimated
share in 2001 and comparing the prediction with the actual 2005 outcome.
The best and worst results for each party are given in Table 5.
Most of these are relatively easy to understand. As has been mentioned,
the retirement of a popular incumbent probably explains why the Conservatives
did better and the Liberal Democrats much worse than would have been
expected in Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk. The dramatically changed
tactical situation facing voters in Dumfries and Galloway - the old Galloway
and Upper Nithsdale constituency had been a Conservative-SNP marginal
whereas the new seat was expected to see a close Labour-Conservative
contest - probably explains why Labour did better and the SNP and Liberal
Democrats worse than would have been expected. It is possible that a
significant proportion of former tactical voters for the SNP in the Galloway
part of the seat switched to Labour. Similarly, the 2001 estimates revealed
that the Liberal Democrats were in the best position to challenge Labour
in East Dunbartonshire and the seat based on Inverness while the Conservatives
were best placed in Dumfriesshire, hence the good performances by them
and the relatively poor results for other challenging parties. On the
other hand, the figures for Ross, Skye and Lochaber - good for the Liberal
Democrats, bad for Labour - probably reflect the personal appeal of Charles
Kennedy, the party leader.
In the case of Inverclyde, however, it seems likely that, on the basis
of local election results, the strength of the Liberal Democrats in the
wards that were transferred into the constituency was somewhat overestimated
and that of the SNP underestimated.
Table 5: Best and worst results for each party
Best
|
|
Worst
|
|
Conservative
|
|
|
|
Dumfriesshire etc
|
+11.7
|
East Dunbartonshire
|
-5.6
|
Berwickshire etc
|
+7.1
|
Orkney and Shetland
|
-5.2
|
Perth and North Perthshire
|
+5.7
|
Na h-Eileanan An Iar
|
-5.2
|
Labour
|
|
|
|
Dumfries and Galloway
|
+12.1
|
Na h-Eileanan An Iar
|
-6.4
|
Motherwell & Wishaw
|
+5.7
|
Dunbartonshire West
|
-6.1
|
Airdrie & Shotts
|
+5.5
|
Ross, Skye & Lochaber
|
-5.4
|
Inverclyde
|
+5.0
|
Edinburgh East
|
-5.2
|
Liberal Democrats
|
|
|
|
East Dunbartonshire
|
+8.6
|
Berwickshire etc.
|
-11.1
|
Ross, Skye and Lochaber
|
+8.3
|
Inverclyde
|
-10.3
|
|
|
Dumfriesshire etc.
|
-7.7
|
|
|
Banff & Buchan
|
-6.7
|
|
|
Dumfries and Galloway
|
-6.6
|
SNP
|
|
|
|
Inverclyde
|
+8.7
|
Dumfries and Galloway
|
-11.3
|
Moray
|
+8.3
|
Inverness etc.
|
-7.5
|
Na h-Eileanan An Iar
|
+8.2
|
East Dunbartonshire
|
-5.9
|
|
|
Ross, Skye and Lochaber
|
-5.4
|
The figures show by how much the party in question exceeded or fell
short of its predicted share of the vote. For the statistically minded,
the cases shown are those where the residual (actual minus predicted
score) was at least 1.5 standard deviations away from the mean.
Variations in how the parties' support changed at constituency level
were partly affected by variations in the electoral context. Table 6
shows the changes in the aggregate shares of the votes according to which
two parties were estimated to be in first and second places in 2001.
The Conservatives generally did best where they were challenging Labour
(+1.3%) but also increased support slightly where they were lying second
to the SNP or the Liberal Democrats. They lost ground, however, where
Labour and the Liberal Democrats were the leading contenders - not something,
of course, that would worry the Conservatives unduly. It was in the latter
seats that Labour's losses were heaviest and Liberal Democrat advances
strongest. While the Liberal Democrats may have reached something of
a ceiling in their contests with the Conservatives (+0.9%), there is
no evidence of this where they were challenged by Labour (+10.5%). Although
the SNP's vote share declined in each category, some comfort could be
taken from the fact that the decline was smaller in seats that they held
from the Conservatives (-0.1%) and where they were lying second to Labour
(-1.9%).
Table 6: Overall changes in vote shares in different electoral contexts
|
Top two parties in 2001
|
|
Lab
|
Lab
|
Lab
|
LDem
|
LDem
|
SNP
|
|
Con
|
LDem
|
SNP
|
Con
|
Lab
|
Con
|
Con
|
+1.3
|
-1.1
|
+0.4
|
+0.5
|
-2.0
|
+0.8
|
Lab
|
-2.7
|
-4.7
|
-4.6
|
-0.5
|
-5.4
|
-2.8
|
Lib Dem
|
+5.4
|
+7.6
|
+6.6
|
+0.9
|
+10.5
|
+2.3
|
SNP
|
-4.4
|
-3.2
|
-1.9
|
-1.6
|
-4.5
|
-0.1
|
(N)
|
(7)
|
(9)
|
(29)
|
(4)
|
(5)
|
(3)
|
As with turnout, when we turn from change between elections to variations
in absolute levels of support for the parties across constituencies we
reach familiar territory in that the patterns are very similar to those
evident in previous elections. Correlation coefficients measuring the
associations between the shares of the vote obtained by the parties in
the constituencies and a standard set of socio-demographic variables
are shown in Table 7 and the data contain few surprises. It is noticeable,
first, that relative support for the Conservatives and Labour is more
clearly structured by the socio-demographic character of constituencies
than is support for the Liberal Democrats or, especially, the SNP. Secondly,
two variables do not correlate at all with levels of party support -
the percentages of young people and of ethnic minority residents. The
non-significance of the former is somewhat surprising but the distribution
of the ethnic minority population is very heavily skewed - less than
2% of the population in 42 constituencies and greater than 5% in only
4 - so that it is unrelated to levels of party support.
Looking at the parties separately, the Conservatives, as might be expected,
had a larger share of the vote in constituencies where there were more
professional and managerial workers, owner occupiers, private renters,
older voters, people with degrees, people associated with the Church
of Scotland and in more rural areas. They performed less well where there
were more manual workers, social renters, people belonging to ethnic
minorities, households having no car, Roman Catholics and in more urban
areas. The pattern of Labour support is almost an exact mirror image
of that for the Conservatives. On the other hand, where the coefficients
are significant, the pattern of support across constituencies for the
Liberal Democrats is similar to the Conservative pattern, although it
is interesting to note that the strength of the Church of Scotland is
not related to the size of the Liberal Democrat vote. Only four variables
are significantly related to SNP strength in constituencies - the party
is weaker where there are more professionals and managers, more people
with degrees and in more urban areas while being stronger where there
are more manual workers.
The extent to which the variables listed in Table 7 are themselves inter-related
is illustrated by a series of regression analyses predicting the parties'
vote shares in constituencies on the basis of socio-demographic characteristics.
Only two variables are significant for the Conservatives (% in agriculture
and % professional and managerial) and together they account for 69%
of the variation in Conservative vote shares. For Labour, 71% of the
variation is accounted for by % social renters, % in agriculture, % owner
occupiers and % Roman Catholic. Only one variable is significant in the
case of the Liberal Democrats (% social renters) and only 25% of the
variation is explained while for the SNP the variation explained is even
smaller (20%), although two variables are significant (% professional
and managerial and % social renters).
Table 7: Bivariate correlations between party shares of vote in 2005
and constituency characteristics
|
Conservative
|
Labour
|
Liberal Democrat
|
SNP
|
% Professional & Managerial
|
+0.390
|
-0.336
|
+0.439
|
-0.410
|
% Manual Workers
|
-0.406
|
+0.417
|
-0.491
|
+0.385
|
% Owner occupiers
|
+0.409
|
-0.427
|
+0.388
|
-0.153*
|
% Social renters
|
-0.534
|
+0.663
|
-0.512
|
+0.136*
|
% Private renters
|
+0.285
|
-0.446
|
+0.303
|
-0.097*
|
% Aged 18-24
|
-0.255*
|
+0.177*
|
-0.034*
|
-0.127*
|
% Aged 65+
|
+0.350
|
-0.314
|
+0.053*
|
+0.127*
|
% In agriculture
|
+0.661
|
-0.646
|
+0.291
|
+0.058*
|
Persons per hectare
|
-0.295
|
+0.314
|
-0.088
|
-0.261
|
% Ethnic minority
|
-0.162*
|
+0.126*
|
+0.004*
|
-0.217*
|
% With degrees
|
+0.381
|
-0.440
|
+0.488
|
-0.396
|
% With no car
|
-0.528
|
+0.591
|
-0.417
|
-0.008*
|
% Church of Scotland
|
+0.551
|
-0.431
|
0.165*
|
0.095*
|
% Roman Catholic
|
-0.528
|
+0.729
|
-0.437
|
-0.102*
|
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant except those
asterisked; (N = 58).
It is interesting to note that, even although there are many fewer constituencies
involved, variations in Conservative and Labour support across Scotland
are less predictable on the basis of the social characteristics of constituencies
than is the case across Britain as a whole. The same variables (other
than religious denomination) explain 81% of the variation in the Conservative
vote and 76% of the variation in the Labour vote across all British constituencies.
The reason why the Scottish figures are smaller is because of the complexity
of the party system. For a variety of reasons, different parties are
in competition in socially similar areas. The electorate is aware of
this and hence people of similar social backgrounds vote for different
parties in different constituencies.
Conclusion
All four major parties in Scotland could take something positive from
the 2005 general election. In somewhat difficult circumstances, Labour
remained easily the dominant party in terms of votes and won two-thirds
of the seats. The Liberal Democrats had their largest share of the vote
since the heyday of the Liberal-SDP Alliance in 1983 and advanced to
11 seats. The SNP vote share fell back but, presumably due to efficiently
targeted campaigning, picked up two additional seats. Even the Conservatives
inched forward from the nadir of 2001 and ‘'gained' a seat - even
if it was not the one that most people expected.
On the other hand, there were also disturbing signs for each party.
Labour's vote share was its lowest in Scotland since 1983 and this evidences
considerable disenchantment with the government. The Liberal Democrats
are now in second place to Labour in 16 seats and might hope at some
stage to win three of them - Aberdeen South, Edinburgh South and Edinburgh
North and Leith. After that, however, the gaps are large and it is difficult
to see where they could go from there. Moreover, the context of the election
was ideal for the Liberal Democrats - an unpopular government and a not
very popular Opposition - and it may well be that such a propitious situation
will not be repeated next time round. For the SNP, the decline in vote
share must be worrying. Although the party's first priority is probably
the Scottish Parliament elections, wining only 18% of the general election
votes does diminish its claim to speak for Scotland. Finally, the Conservatives
remain in a pickle. Besides winning one seat, they came second in only
15 and of these only Dumfries and Galloway, Angus and Perth and North
Perthshire are within reasonable reach. The road back for Scottish Conservatives
at general elections still looks hard and rocky.
References
Denver, D., Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (2004) Media Guide
to the New Scottish Westminster Parliamentary Constituencies,
LGC elections centre, Plymouth.
Denver, D. and Hands, G. (2004) ‘'Exploring Variations in Turnout:
Constituencies and Wards in the Scottish Parliament Elections of 1999
and 2003', British Journal of Politics and International Relations,
Vol 6, No. 4, pp. 527-42.
June 2005
David Denver is Professor of Politics at Lancaster University.
(online 26 May 2006)
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