

BRITAIN'S HABSBURG QUESTION? TOM NAIRN, SIR ERNEST BARKER AND THE MULTI-NATIONAL STATE

Arthur Aughey

It has become fashionable to define Britishness in terms of what it lacks. Norman Davies's influential **The Isles: A History** has helped to confirm the fashion (without actually being aware that it is an example of that fashion), arguing that Britishness is not the attribute of a nation state, that the British are confused about their identity and lack a clear sense of the state to which they belong (1999). One commentator has remarked that there has developed an 'almost German-style debate about British identity' which has alerted us to the political 'fragility' of the United Kingdom (Garton Ash 2001). Those matters which once appeared alien (or Germanic) in the context of (relative) historical stability - national identity, statehood, political legitimacy - have now moved closer to the centre of public debate. As a consequence, there has emerged a notable mood of fatalism about the survival of the Union and an anxiety about things falling apart. Here one may note a certain irony. As that now rather neglected political thinker, Sir Ernest Barker, once argued, German-style debates are a distinctly un-British thing. The British are not given to an 'indulgence in Weltschmerz' (1947, p. 558). Their solid pragmatic virtues, he believed, did not lend themselves to such soulful self-torment.

Barker's reflections on this subject are worth noting because they illuminate not only an ideal of Britishness often neglected in recent commentary but also because they illustrate why that ideal is no longer so persuasive as it

*Arthur Aughey is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Ulster at Jordanstown. He has published widely on Northern Ireland and on British Conservatism. His latest book is **Nationalism, Devolution and the Challenge to the United Kingdom State** (Pluto Press 2001).*

Britain's Habsburg Question?

once was. Moreover, he helped to define the official character of British politics in that period described by one critic as the 'moment of British nationalism' (Harvie 2000). Julia Stapleton has resurrected an interest in Barker's contribution to national self-understanding (especially in England) and her conclusion was that it is 'unlikely that the high level of instinctual patriotism which inspired the political thought of so many of his generation' could be recovered in modern times but that there were indeed 'luminous dimensions of his work' which repay consideration (1994, p. 221). In particular, Barker's work was informed by a distinctively liberal theory of British nationhood which, if observed from a different standpoint, could be read as the ideology of Englishness. Barker, rather like Burke, was a great melodist, orchestrating the many tones of what he called 'national character' into an ideal harmony. This was no mere ideal, of course. In the terms of Barker's philosophical Idealism, this liberal nationality represented the truth of British public life. Hence the inappropriateness of a soulful Weltschmerz or the longing for an authentic collective self. The inestimable value of the institutions of British governance were all one needed for a secure identity.

The starting point of contemporary Weltschmerz - or, in the case of nationalists, Schadenfreude - is to be found in the discontent with the functioning of those traditional institutions. The mildly academic Podsnappery of Barker's age has become the inverted academic Podsnappery of our own. However, there is actually an interesting history to this discontent. It may be found in the development of an analogy. It is the analogy of the United Kingdom with the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The person who has been responsible for the very effective dissemination of this analogy is Tom Nairn and the most recently sustained elaboration of it can be found in his book **After Britain** (2000a) and the article 'Ukania under Blair' (2000b). It is the argument of this article that while the analogy may be useful for a number of political objectives - to promote the modernisation of public institutions, to promote the nationalist cause in Scotland, to promote a republican agenda - it actually hinders a clear understanding of the history of British multi-nationalism and it distracts attention from the source of its current difficulties. The article does not take issue with these political objectives (indeed, they may all be achieved) but does take issue with the relevance of the analogy. The purpose here is to state briefly the analogy as Nairn developed it, to criticise it in the light of Barker's reflections on multi-nationalism and to conclude by examining their relevance for an understanding of the present British question.

UKANIA AS KAKANIA

Nairn's **The Break-Up of Britain** contained some brilliant insights which helped students of British politics to see the subject afresh even if that did not necessarily encourage them to accept either the analysis or the conclusions (1977, p. 329). Here was nationalism re-interpreted in the idiom of Marxism and Marxism made at ease in the company of nationalism. But as that idiom lost its hold on the radical imagination then nationalism emerged from its Marxist shell. This would have come as a surprise to some students of his work. Willie Thompson, for example, thought that Nairn could never be considered an emotional nationalist (1992, p. 314). Joan Cocks equally believed that despite his apparent support for nationalist politics Nairn could not be a nationalist in politics because of his appreciation of nationalism's ideological ambiguity (1996, p. 528). It would be difficult to sustain either of those positions today, especially when one reads the relentless polemic of **After Britain**. Over the years, many of Nairn's arguments have become absorbed into the collective consciousness about the future of the British state and not only on the nationalist side. This marks one small triumph for a Gramscian intellectual. However, that does not remove their contentious quality.

A distinctive and long-running theme of Nairn's is the analogy between the last years of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the contemporary British state. Robert Musil's term Kakanian which he used in his trilogy **The Man Without Qualities** to conjure up the spiritual decay of the Habsburg monarchy was translated by Nairn into the term Ukania to describe the collapsing authority of the British state. This is a trope which Gregory Elliott has traced to Nairn's **New Left Review** articles as far back as the early 1960s (1998, p. 205). It is a term which has helped to set a frame of reference for journalists as distinguished as Neal Ascherson and academics as distinguished as David Marquand. The question is: how appropriate an analogy is it? When Nairn was writing as an historian he thought it was inappropriate. 'The United Kingdom state', he argued, 'was neither a standard-issue nation-state nor an ancien regime comparable to the Habsburg and other empires' (1997, p. 212). However, when he was writing as a polemicist it did become appropriate. In **After Britain** the Windsors take the role of the Habsburgs, a tenaciously self-interested Hausmacht which had been the subject of another influential Nairn polemic **The Enchanted Glass** (1994). New Labour, a new 'charmed circle of power' and like its old

Britain's Habsburg Question?

Viennese cultural counterpart part of a decadent *société du spectacle*, becomes an 'insanely pretentious' but superficial 'pseudo-democracy'. All its efforts to prop up the regime must come to nought. The United Kingdom remains, as it had been in **The Break-up of Britain**, an imperial prisonhouse from which the nations are struggling to be free.

It was once said that a Great Power, like Britain, can endure with difficulty one Ireland. But when it is composed of nothing but Irelands, like Austria-Hungary, then things are less promising. It is Nairn's prediction that if Britain is not already composed of many Irelands then it soon will be (and they will be called Scotland, Wales and England). The consequence will also be the same for London as it was for Imperial Vienna. The evidence is there for the wise to see. According to Nairn, one reason why analysts have failed to compare Ukania with its predecessor-in-decay Kakanian is simply 'an accidental time-lapse'. Moreover, the 'idea persists of Austria-Hungary being truly old and "feudal" while Great Britain is middle-aged and yet somehow intrinsically "modern". In truth, the later Hapsburg imperium was effectively only as old as Napoleon and Metternich - i.e. a good deal more youthful than the empire of transplanted Hanover (later "Windsor")' (2000a, p. 28). The future of the United Kingdom is behind it.

The most forceful political argument that one finds in Nairn's critique of Ukania and in the critiques of those who follow his lead is its lack of a democratically defensible idea of the 'people'. This is the Habsburgian - or multi-national - problem in a nutshell. On the one hand, a multi-national union like Austria-Hungary (or the United Kingdom) is on dangerous ground if allegiance is entirely preserved by its component national identities. On the other hand, its multi-nationality is contradicted by an exclusive allegiance to a transcendent, institutional identity. Here is the making of a paradox to which, according to Nairn, the United Kingdom can no longer find a workable solution.

That paradox is the paradox of democratic politics defined at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the English philosopher Bernard Bosanquet as 'the paradox of self-government' (1910). The paradox starts with the existence of political authority and social coercion and asks how can these be reconciled with modern freedom and self-determination. It is, in other words, a question of political obligation and its other side, political legitimacy. Why should a community obey laws and rules which, at first glance, might not be those of its own choosing? How can the term 'self-

Scottish Affairs

government' apply to those making the laws and also to those obliged to obey them? The press of this question intensified as, in the course of the nineteenth century, the people jostled for their place on the political stage. Political legitimation demanded some acknowledgement that the state was an expression of the people (Canovan 1999, p 13). The historical confluence of such demands generated one way of solving the paradox of self-government. That solution was nationalism.

Nationalists addressed the paradox of self-government by asserting the necessary identity of ruler and ruled. It did so by way of the logical equation: the national people is the sovereign people. The collective self (the nation) is only obliged to obey the law because its identity is reflected back to it by the personnel of its government (one's own kind) and by the purpose of state power (advancing the national interest). Identity and loyalty are one and the same. This seemed so self-evidently natural a solution to the paradox that any alternative began to appear illogical, unnatural, or, in Linda Colley's term, 'forged'(1992). Political legitimacy now lay with the national people. It was Nairn who proposed, with admirable clarity and insight 'that a mobilizable nationalism is not only a matter of having common traditions, revered institutions, or a rich community of customs and reflexes'. Nationalism, he argued, is not a question of cultural identity. Rather, the 'mobilizing myth of nationalism is an idea of the people' (1981, pp. 294-5). This popular mobilisation spelt the death of Austria-Hungary and, ultimately, will spell the death of that 'pseudo-transcendence', the United Kingdom.

Britishness was never an identity sufficiently democratic or sufficiently transcendent that it displaced its diverse constituent national loyalties. It was not, in French terms, sufficiently universal. As Emile Boutmy argued at the beginning of the 20th century, Britain was only a geographical expression. This 'is true of the United Kingdom as a whole: it does not constitute a political unity, and still less a moral unity. Each of its four parts feels its own individuality, and is conscious of a distinct life'. This untidy and irrational arrangement Boutmy found difficult to understand. They would certainly have ordered things better in France. 'Is it possible', he asked, 'to imagine France occupying the position towards one of her dependencies which England has adopted towards these three Celtic countries: certainly she would not have taken a century to merge their individuality in her own and efface the differences which might hinder the establishment of a general system of government' (Boutmy 1904, p. 98). The Ukania thesis proposes

Britain's Habsburg Question?

that such a possibility of a general system of British governance rooted in a common popular identity, if it ever were a possibility, has now gone. As a consequence, all that remains of the multi-national Union is the distinct life of its four parts.

Britain lacks a coherent identity (the Davies problem) precisely because it never absorbed the democratic ideal of French popular sovereignty. Indeed, as Nairn rightly argues, much of the state's official identity developed in opposition to that ideal. Like Austria-Hungary, Britain experienced a form of arrested political development specified in its archaic monarchism and aristocratic constitution. The Union, in other words, was a political form dedicated to the frustration of the egalitarian 'idea of the people'. In Britain, established power merely colonised national sentiment in order to deprive it of democratic effect. Contemporary radicalism can only find expression in the mode of national and republican self-assertion. For those who share Nairn's politics, this idea is about to come to fruition at last in Scotland. The British state must itself be transcended in order that the national peoples can enter fully into their republican inheritance and fully take their place in the new Europe. New Labour is incapable of halting the slide. Here is the contemporary radical agenda which Nairn, more than anyone else, has helped to set.

THE BARKER VIEW

Sir Ernest Barker's thoughts on multi-nationalism provide an interesting corrective to the logic and implication of the Nairn view. His reflections on these matters take Lord Acton's famous article, 'Nationality', first published in 1862, as its starting point. In the old European system, argued Acton, the rights of nationalities were neither recognised by governments nor asserted by the people. 'Beginning by a protest against the dominion of race over race, its mildest and least developed form, it grew into a condemnation of every State that included different races, and finally became the complete and consistent theory, that the State and the nation must be co-extensive' (Acton 1909, p.385). In the history of national theory, two distinctive political forms emerged. First, there developed the 'right of national unity which is a product of democracy'. Second, there developed 'that claim of national liberty which belongs to the theory of freedom' (p. 288). For Acton, these two views of nationality were connected in name only and in reality stood at the opposite ends of political thought. The latter was distinguished from the former

Scottish Affairs

because 'it tends to diversity and not to uniformity, to harmony and not to unity; because it aims not at arbitrary change, but at careful respect for the existing conditions of political life, and because it obeys the laws and the results of history, not the aspirations of an ideal future' (p. 289). The co-existence of several nations under the same state indicated 'a state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism' (p. 290). It is this Actonian, aristocratic view which is really the implicit target of the Ukania thesis. But was the Acton view of the United Kingdom an accurate one?

In **National Character and the Factors in its Formation**, Barker dissented from it. While acknowledging the intellectual force of Acton's essay, Barker took issue with him on the character of the multi-national state. Interestingly, this was, in effect, a surrogate criticism of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire for which Acton expressed some sympathy. Barker thought that Acton's understanding was defective for a number of reasons. First, the sort of multi-nationalism with which he seemed content - the Habsburg model - 'either pits each nation against the rest to secure its own absolutism, or allows itself to become the organ of one of the nations for the suppression of the others' (1928, p. 16). Second, Acton assumed that nationality existed in two different forms. First, there was nationality as only a social fact and without political expression. It revealed itself 'in common thoughts and feelings, custom and dress, language and possibly literature'. Second, there was nationality as a political as well as a social fact where 'it issues in a common organization, possessed of authority, which expresses a common and independent will'. This was true, argued Barker, but only up to a point. It was too neat. It showed its limitations clearly when applied to the British case. 'There is a sense' he thought, 'in which the Scottish and the Welsh peoples are nations of the first degree, content with the social expression of their quality'. But this was only the half of it. 'On the other hand, the members of these peoples are also members of a nation - the British nation - which is a nation of the second degree; they are heirs of its past traditions and masters by their vote of its future destinies; nor would they be content with nationhood in the first degree unless, in another form, they also possessed it in the second'.

In the United Kingdom (and contra Nairn) Barker believed it was democracy which had transformed the fate of multi-nationalism. An autocratic state might have united under the single will of the monarch a number of nations that were required to remain in the first degree, that is as mere social groups.

Britain's Habsburg Question?

This was no longer possible in the era of popular politics. In stating his reason why this was so, Barker expresses a key notion of British liberal multi-nationalism. 'A democratic State which is multi-national will fall asunder into as many democracies as there are nationalities, dissolved by the very fact of will which should be the basis of its life - unless, indeed, as we have somehow managed in our island, such a State can be both multi-national and a single nation, and teach its citizens at one and the same time to glory both in the name of Scotsmen or Welshmen or Englishmen and in the name of Britons' (1928, p. 17). The assumption, quite clearly, was that of a problem solved. It is the political basis of that solution which today has come to appear rather fragile (and not the United Kingdom's similarities with Austria-Hungary). Barker, though, was not unaware of the difficulties.

He agreed that the 'Scotsman' had a distinct nationhood. But 'he is also a partner in the broader fund of British nationality. He has the two homes of the Scottish and British nation. If he is satisfied with his double domicile, no question arises. If he should ever resolve to prefer a single home, and to stay there, he will have his way' (1928, p. 130). There is no suggestion here of a British state one and indivisible. The national association which Barker believed secured freedom was also a free association. If the Scots should choose to leave that was their right. No power could or should stand in their way. In his influential **Principles of Social and Political Theory**, Barker further acknowledged the special case of Scotland and, in anticipation of another of Nairn's arguments, accepted that it was 'seldom easy for a national minority to be content to exist simply as a social group'. There always existed pressures to push beyond that limit to full statehood. It was no good trying to make hard and fast rules about that limit for it all depended on the disposition of the nations in a multi-national state like the United Kingdom. It also depended on circumstance. 'To distinguish between the "social" and "legal" sphere' is no solution unless the national minorities are 'willing to recognize and observe that distinction'. And this applied as well to the majority nation, the English (1951, p. 57).

It is possible to identify here the outline of an ideal which may be read as an alternative to the French idea of popular sovereignty celebrated by Nairn. It attempted to distinguish two ideas which the formula 'the nationalist people is the sovereign people' collapsed. These two ideas are nationalism and nationality. Of course for the nationalist, as Nairn correctly pointed out, nationality alone is insufficient. It is an identity arrested only at the level of

Scottish Affairs

culture, in itself but not for itself. By contrast, Barker's view supposed - and without prejudice to the existing traditions of nationality within the union - that a new sovereign people had been brought into existence by the creation of the United Kingdom. Britishness involved an idea of the people and of its identity rather different from that of nationalism. It proposed that the constitutional people is the sovereign people. It was not Britishness as an affective identity alone which defined the United Kingdom (though it was in part). Nor was it the simple Habermasian acknowledgement of the legitimacy of constitutional arrangements (though it was that also). Rather, the history of a common loyalty to the constitution and its corresponding identity had created a new political persona. And it was in this 'artificial' persona - the constitutional (British) people - that the identity of ruler and ruled was to be found and with it the resolution of Bosanquet's paradox of self-government.

There was union in difference or what today would be called 'duality' (see McMillan 1999). It was an arrangement certainly grounded in the contingencies of history (Acts of Union). But this did not mean that it was without solidarity. Britishness was unitary only in a limited sense, partly because of the unifying symbolism of the Crown, partly because of shared political experience. Otherwise, it claimed to accommodate diverse and distinctive institutions, practices and cultures. This subtle ideal often worked in a fit of absence of mind - so absentmindedly that most people, especially the English, had difficulty describing it properly (which is really the substance of Davies's critique); and so subtly that those governing the country, especially the English, often failed to understand properly what they had helped to bring into existence (and which Barker felt duty bound to remind them). Whatever the reservations - and they were commonly held and frequently voiced - this British solution to the paradox of self-government in a multinational state proved to be distinctive and relatively enduring.

Barker's final remarks on the Austria-Hungary analogy are worth noting. He admitted that the 'multiplicity of our system (if it can be called a system) may remind us of the multiplicity of the old Austria-Hungary'. However, there was, he thought, a fundamental difference. 'Austria-Hungary had no common national fund which could contain, without abolishing, the separate national funds of the Austrians, the Czechs, the Poles, the Magyars, and the Southern Slavs'. Britain has been more fortunate (only one Ireland) and 'perhaps more prudent'. In Britain have been combined 'separate national funds with a common national substance'. No line has been artificially drawn between the

Britain's Habsburg Question?

'social fact' of nationality and the 'political scheme' of the state (1928, p 131). Even if three-quarters of century after Barker's remarks one were to admit that the 'common national substance' of Britishness is waning and the 'separate national funds' are waxing that does not necessarily entail acceptance of the sort of four nations and a funeral prospect which Nairn outlines for Ukania-Kakania - 'transition from the management of decline into the management of disintegration, leading eventually to a suitable testament and funeral arrangements' (Nairn 2000a, p. 58). One does not have to accept it because Britain, as Barker knew, is nothing like Austria-Hungary. Barker's was an elegant statement of liberal multi-culturalism. What are its current difficulties and how has it been re-thought?

SUSTAINING MULTI-NATIONAL BRITAIN: A QUESTION OF DEGREE?

An initial suggestion may come from a former part of the Habsburg Empire. The Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek has suggested that the modern state was a product of a shift in fundamental allegiance from the particular and intimate local community to the universal and abstract national community (and in more elegant English that is also what Barker had claimed). What distinguishes the contemporary state, however, is a reversal of that shift. The state, especially a multi-national state like the United Kingdom, is increasingly experienced as abstract, distant and alien. Postmodern societies are looking for smaller, more authentic forms of identification. As Žižek put it, today what we are experiencing is the postmodern 'ethnicization of the national' in contrast to the modern 'nationalization of the ethnic'. This is a reaction to 'the universal dimension of the world market' and it takes place on that market's own terrain. What is taking place is not a return to the authentic form of immediate community but rather the appearance of its exact opposite: *'this very reassertion of "primordial" identification signals that the loss of organic-substantial unity is fully consummated'* (1997, p. 42 italics in original). What Žižek supplies is a sophisticated theoretical substantiation of the historical charges made by critics of contemporary nationalism (and of Nairn) like Eric Hobsbawm. The precarious unity of modern states (for example, the United Kingdom), hard won and enlightened, is threatened by 'the transnational market function and the relationship to the ethnic Thing'. The destruction of a multi-national state like the United Kingdom will signal not national liberation but 'the final emancipation of the logic of the market'

Scottish Affairs

(p. 43). And for 'market' one might substitute European Union. Whether one accepts the contentious conclusions at which Zizek arrives (and civic nationalists would immediately dissent from Zizek's focus on ethnicity and others from his hostility to the global market) what is striking is how familiar would be his explication to Sir Ernest Barker.

For Barker, as we have seen, the Scottish and Welsh peoples were not just nations of the first degree (cultural entities). Their political expression was secured by participation in a larger democratic nation of the second degree, the British (1928, pp. 16-17). However, as we have also seen, Barker accepted that Scotland had the attributes of a distinctive state and even if these attributes were less visible in Wales, they could not be said to be absent there either (pp. 130-1). He also accepted that it might be difficult for a nation like the Scots to remain satisfied with being a nation of the first degree if they were to become disenchanted with their experience of nationality in the second degree. If the Scots desired independent statehood they would have their way. One might argue today that the process which Zizek claims to have identified and the possibility which Barker once acknowledged have remarkable similarities. A simple reading, for which there is some good empirical evidence, suggests that a shift in primary identity is taking place in Britain (McCrone 1998, pp. 138-40).

As a consequence there has been a disturbing of the 'degree' within the United Kingdom about which Barker wrote and with it a re-assessment of the territorial priorities of multi-nationalism. Nationalists like Nairn expect that the first degree of identity will come to displace completely that of the second (British) degree and that the respective national peoples will emancipate themselves from the old constraints of the British constitutional people. This has coincided with what some have considered to be a transformation in the relationship between culture, class and nationality (Heath and Taylor 1999, pp. 149-168).

The present devolution programme of the Labour government, one might argue, is an attempt to respond to this change of degree. Therefore it is not such a capitulation to nationalism as Geekie and Levy once suggested (1989, p. 402). In Scotland, what Labour is trying to effect is a compromise between the claims of the sovereign (Scottish) people and the traditional claims of the constitutional (British) people. And in an interesting amendment of the institutional assumptions of Barker, Gordon Brown has argued that because national identity resides with the people reform of institutions do not threaten

Britain's Habsburg Question?

British identity. Brown's distinctive 'British way' means that the British state remains the focus of multinational collective identity (1997, pp. 15-16). New Labour's task is to promote 'a new civic patriotism built on local democracy and strong communities' in a Britain 'where people accept the personal and social obligations of citizenship as well as the benefits that flow from it' (2000, p. 23). Devolution is about forging a new common citizenship in the shared space of the United Kingdom, where degrees of national principle do not conflict with the achievement of multi-national purposes.

This neo-Gladstonianism is very much in the liberal tradition of Barker himself. His accommodating multi-nationalism was concerned to foster a relaxed view of identity - a dual sense of nationality in Scotland and Wales and a benign confusion of Englishness and Britishness elsewhere (Ireland appeared to be the exception which proved the liberal rule). It remains the hope of New Labour that devolution is the appropriate response to changing degrees of identity in the United Kingdom. The cohesion of the state and the union of the constitutional people may be sustained by the qualification of the absolute sovereignty of Westminster and the admission of degrees of self-governance in Edinburgh, Cardiff and, in a different context, Belfast. Of course, it could all fall apart and Nairn's predictions could come true. But this will have had nothing to do with Austria-Hungary.

REFERENCES

- Acton, John Emerich Edward (Lord) (1909), **The History Of Freedom And Other Essays**. London: Macmillan.
- Barker, E. (1928) **National Character and The Factors In Its Formation**. London: Methuen.
- Barker, E. (1947), **The Character of England**. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Barker, E. (1951) **The Principles of Social and Political Theory**. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Bosanquet, B. (1910) **The Philosophical Theory of the State** 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.
- Boutmy, E. (1904). **The English People: A Study of their Political Psychology**. London: T. Fisher Unwin.
- Brown, G. (1997) 'Outward Bound', **The Spectator**, 8 November.
- Brown, G. (2000) 'Why the party still needs its soul', pp. 21-23, **New Statesman**, 23 February.

Scottish Affairs

- Canovan, M. (1999) 'Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy', pp. 2-17, **Political Studies** Vol. XLVII.
- Cocks, J. (1996) 'From Politics to Paralysis. Critical Intellectuals Answer the National Question', pp. 518-37, **Political Theory**, Vol. 24, No. 3.
- Colley, L. (1992) **Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837**. London: Pimlico.
- Davies, N. (1999) **The Isles: A History**. London: Macmillan.
- Geekie, J. and R. Levy (1989) 'Devolution and the Tartanisation of the Labour Party', pp. 399-412, **Parliamentary Affairs** Vol. 42, No. 3.
- Harvie, C. (2000) 'The Moment of British Nationalism, 1939-1970', pp. 328-40, **Political Quarterly** Vol. 71, no. 3.
- Heath, A. and B. Taylor (1999) 'Were the Welsh and Scottish referendums second-order elections?', pp. 149-168, in B. Taylor and K. Thomson (eds) **Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?** Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- McCrone, D. (1998) **The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's ancestors** London: Routledge.
- McMillan, J. (1999) 'Remind me who I am again...', pp. 30-33, **New Statesman Scotland**, 5 July.
- Nairn, T. (1977) **The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism** London: NLB.
- Nairn, T. (1994) **The Enchanted Glass. Britain and its Monarchy**. London: Vintage.
- Nairn, T. (2000a) **After Britain. New Labour and the Return of Scotland** London: Granta.
- Nairn, T. (2000b) 'Ukania under Blair', pp. 69-104, **New Left Review** (Second Series) Vol. 1.
- Stapleton, J. (1994) **Englishness and the Study of Politics. The social and political thought of Ernest Barker**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thompson, W. (1992) 'Tom Nairn and the Crisis of the British State', pp. 306-25, **Contemporary Record**, Vol. 6, No. 2.
- Zizek, S. (1997) 'Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism', pp. 28-51, **New Left Review** 225 September/October.

June 2001