

THE MYTH OF THE MACHO SCOTSMAN: ATTITUDES TO GENDER, WORK AND THE FAMILY IN THE UK, IRELAND AND EUROPE

John MacInnes

It is a common assumption in everyday conversation that attitudes towards gender are more conservative in Scotland than in other parts of Britain, and that this is particularly true of Scottish men. We expect the inhabitants of Govan to take a more traditional approach to gender roles than those of Islington. This assumption perhaps has two origins. Many of the ideological myths which are central to Scottish national identity are based around rigid and conservative gender hierarchies. Highland clans, tartanry and kailyard are full of images of men and women occupying quite distinct social positions. Some of the more modern myths which have been contrasted to these, such as the myth of Red Clydeside, are based around gender hierarchies which are no less stark. For example Red Clydeside still evokes images of men involved in industrial struggle: the Clyde Workers Committee, Gallacher or MacLean. The role of women in the munitions factories of the first world war, or their leadership of the struggle over housing and fair rents, is given less attention (Melling 1983). As McCrone (1992, p.97) has noted, it is significant that the central ideological figure of nineteenth century Scots egalitarianism - 'the lad o' pairts' - was exactly that; there were no 'lasses o' pairts'.

Contemporary Scottish public life and politics has been dominated by men. As the series of Engender reports has shown (for example, Breitenbach and Brown 1993) there are few women in positions of responsibility or prominence in Scottish economic, social or political life. It is hardly a surprise that the first prime minister of the Scottish parliament will be a Donald or an Alex rather than a Mary or a Sandra. Figures such as Ann Gloag, Helena Kennedy or Helen Liddel are very much the exception rather than the

John MacInnes is a senior lecturer in the department of sociology, Edinburgh university.

rule. In the 1979 General Election Scotland managed to elect just one woman MP - the lowest percentage of women public representatives in Europe. Although the proportion of women workers is slightly higher in Scotland than south of the border, so that in parts of Scotland women now form the majority of the workforce, Scottish women face the same inequalities as their counterparts in the rest of the UK; very few are in senior positions, and on average they are in less skilled, less well rewarded and less secure jobs.

Such assumptions about popular attitudes can be misleading, however. The election in May 1997 of at least four openly gay Labour MPs showed that the British electorate is not as homophobic as we might assume, for example, and that the contrast in attitudes between 'the person in the street' and 'trendy intellectuals' is not always what we imagine it to be. So too there have been some indications that Scotland is not just a refuge for male chauvinism. For example Brown et al (1996, p.174) discuss a 1994 opinion poll published in **The Scotsman** in which 85% of Scottish voters said there were not enough women involved in politics, 76% said that parties should make special efforts to involve more women, and - despite the reputation of Mrs Thatcher in Scotland, a reputation recently enhanced by her eve-of-referendum visit - 72% said that government would make better decisions if more women were involved in politics. The proportion of woman MPs in Scotland has increased significantly, thanks to Labour's policy of women-only shortlists and the electoral demise of the Conservative Party. The Zero Tolerance campaign about violence against women has been an effective and explicitly feminist initiative which has been popular with both women and men in Scotland.

A survey of social attitudes towards the family and gender roles, conducted in 1994 in ten different European states under the International Social Survey Program, allows us to look at some empirical evidence in comparative perspective, including comparisons between different parts of the UK (see Appendix). There are a couple of qualifications which need to be borne in mind when analysing the results. The first is the size of the sample in individual parts of the UK. Although the survey covered some ten thousand respondents across Europe, including just under one thousand in Great Britain, only 86 were in Scotland and 50 in Wales. Such small samples still make it possible to make general comparisons between the views of people in Scotland and elsewhere with a reasonable degree of confidence in the accuracy of the figures, but they are too small to make more detailed analyses of different kinds of respondent in Scotland according to their occupation, age and so on. The second concerns the methodology of the opinion survey as an instrument of social research. The experience of survey research has often shown that it is difficult to determine in advance precisely how respondents will interpret questions about attitudes. Different respondents will place

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slightly different meanings on key phrases. These must be taken account of in the analysis of the results, of course, and careful piloting can minimise the ambiguity in questions so that researcher and respondents can be more confident that they are talking about the same thing. But it is inevitable that fairly small modifications to the wording of a question can produce fairly substantial changes in the response obtained. Clearly, in an international survey, conducted in several different languages, there is always the possibility that some of the differences in the results produced by different countries are simply caused by the slightly different wording produced by translating a question across different languages and cultural contexts. When making comparisons across the UK and Ireland however, where English is a common language, this poses much less of a problem.

Finally, any survey of opinions or behaviour depends on there being some connection between what respondents say to an interviewer, and their actual views or behaviour. Respondents may feel it easier to proffer an answer that they perceive to be popular or socially acceptable than one which they think is controversial, or they may simply lie or joke. A respondent who is a paragon of political correctness in their answers to the survey questionnaire may in reality and behaviour be a thorough misogynist. But social research has shown that, with carefully worded questions, surveys can produce information which is reliable enough to chart important trends in social attitudes and behaviour.

THE MALE BREADWINNER SYSTEM AND ITS IDEOLOGY

The view that men have a greater concern with work and career (and are ultimately 'instrumental') while women have a greater interest in the family and nurturance, especially of young children (and are ultimately 'expressive'), underpins many of our notions of masculinity and femininity, and has also reflected both the actual behaviour of men and women and public policy on work and the family. The Beveridge Report which laid the foundations for the modern British welfare state assumed that it was a husband's main role to provide for his wife and children by earning a family wage, and that it was his wife's role to care for him and their children. Such a strict division of labour and resources by sex was never completely achieved in Britain (although it had many strong institutional supports, such as bars on employment of married women which only disappeared in the 1960s). In particular working class women usually had to find some source of income to supplement the man's wage. However, over the last half century the steady rise of women's employment has undermined it. For over three years now there have been more women employees in Scotland than men. In September 1997, the last

date for which figures were available, there were 1,023,000 women employees at work in Scotland, compared to 973,000 men. The number of women workers in England and Wales is still marginally less than the number of men, but will almost certainly catch up in the next few years. According to the General Household Survey across the UK, about two thirds of families with children at home have both parents in paid work compared to less than a third where only the father works. Of course this does not mean labour market equality for Scottish men and women. Women continue to be over-represented in part time, temporary, low-paid or low-status jobs.

This development is part of a broader pattern of change in the division of labour between the sexes in Western industrial capitalism. In the 15 European Union countries the activity rate of women (that is the proportion of adult women who are in the labour force) has risen from 42% in 1960 to 57% in 1994: that is from well under half to around three quarters that of the male rate (MacInnes 1998b). In many countries with below-average female activity rates, the rise has been faster, so that there is a tendency towards convergence both in female activity rates across countries and between male and female rates within countries. Since the male breadwinner system was an important cause of women's forced dependence on men, and their subordination to them, we might expect its demise to weaken the patriarchal family, and attitudes and ideologies associated with that. By giving women the possibility of 'exit' (through greater access to employment) it increases their 'voice' and an alternative to 'loyalty' (Hobson 1990).

NATION, SEX AND EMPLOYMENT AS DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TO GENDER ROLES

Table 1 shows the views of respondents in Scotland about the traditional division of labour between the sexes, what we might call 'male breadwinner ideology'. The table shows two points of interest. The first is that male breadwinner ideology appears to have collapsed along with the male breadwinner system. Only one in five respondents in Scotland agreed with it. As the comparable figures for other European countries shown in table 2 reveal, this is a lower percentage than in the rest of Britain or across Europe as whole. This is a result we could expect however, as there is a strong relationship across different countries between the level of women's employment and views on male breadwinner ideology (MacInnes 1998c), and the level of women's employment in Scotland is relatively high. This relationship would be an even stronger one but for the survival of this ideology in one country which does have a high level of women's employment: Austria.

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Table 1
Respondents views of the statement 'A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family' Scotland

%	Disagree	N.a.n.d.*	Agree	(n)
Male	71	11	18	38
Female	63	17	20	49
All	66	14	19	87

**Neither agree nor disagree*

Table 2
Respondents agreeing with the statement 'A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family'

%	Males	Females	weighted total n	unweighted total n
East Germany	11	11	964	1097
Sweden	12	11	485	1272
Norway	17	14	241	2087
Netherlands	23	16	910	1968
Northern Ireland	26	27	95	647
Great Britain	27	22	3173	984
Italy	39	28	3351	1018
Spain	39	35	2304	2494
West Germany	40	34	3844	2324
Ireland	40	29	196	938
Austria	46	44	469	977
All	33	27	16032	15806

Note: respondents could either 'agree strongly', 'agree', 'disagree' 'disagree strongly' or 'neither agree or disagree' with the statements presented to them. Thus the balance of each percentage shown in the table includes both respondents who explicitly disagreed or disagreed strongly with a statement and those (between 10 and 15% in most cases) who said that they 'neither agreed or disagreed'.

Unweighted n shows the number of respondents in each country. Weighted n shows the number of respondents once weighted to take account of the relative size of adult population in each country, used in calculating the figure for 'all' in the final line of the table.

The second interesting result in table 1 is that men in Scotland disagree with male breadwinner ideology just as much as women. (It is worth remembering the relatively small sample size we are dealing with here. Even so, the probability of men and women's views being substantially different in Scotland are very small. When we add to this the fact that only fairly small differences are recorded in most countries in the survey, we would need to have a plausible hypothesis about what special factor might lead to a divergence of views on the basis of sex only in the Scottish case before we seriously doubted the figures here.)

This may at first seem surprising. We might expect men to uphold the ideal of the male breadwinner and women to oppose it, but this is not the case. Again, as table 2 confirms, Scotland is similar to the rest of Europe in this respect. Both in individual countries, across Europe as a whole, and in North America and Australasia where the survey was also conducted, we find that there are rarely substantial differences between men and women on attitudes to breadwinner ideology. What does seem to make a difference, aside from the country respondents are from, is their age, educational level and the work history of respondents and their families (MacInnes 1998b). Table 3 shows results for Europe as a whole. While less than a quarter of people under 50 agree with the statement, a majority of those over 60 do so. Exposure to education, especially post-school education, also erodes belief in patriarchal ideology. So too does exposure to the market through employment. There is little direct relationship with the employment status of respondents, but this is what we might expect given that participation in employment is so heavily determined by sex, life-cycle and household cycle. But we can control for this by looking at respondents who are or have been parents of pre-school age children. The table breaks them into three groups according to whether the respondents' mothers worked when the respondents were children (defined by working for pay for at least one year before the respondent's fourteenth birthday), and then whether the respondents themselves worked outside the home when they were raising pre-school age children (if they were female) or their partner did (if they were male). Where both their mother and they themselves (or their partner if they were male) worked, only one in five agreed with male breadwinner ideology. Where neither worked, a half did so. It appears that greater exposure to women's employment erodes belief in male breadwinner ideology for both men and women.

Table 3
Respondents agreeing with the statement
'A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and

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family.'

All countries, by age, education and family work history

Age in years	< 30	30's	40's	50's	60+
% Agreeing	15	18	25	41	55
weighted total n	3801	3307	2776	2624	3517
Education	None or primary	Secondary	Post school		
% Agreeing	45	18	14		
weighted total n	5901	5728	2056		
Mother and partner/self work history	Neither worked	One worked	Both worked		
% Agreeing	47	33	19		
weighted total n	3804	3717	2459		

Note: Weighted total n refers to the number of respondents in that category, after weighting adjustments, from which the percentage was calculated. For example, there were 3801 respondents under 30 who gave a view about the breadwinner ideology statement.

Education was defined as follows. Secondary: any attendance at secondary school, whether completed or not. Post school: Any attendance at post school or degree level education, whether completed or not.

Table 4 shows respondent's attitudes to a range of other statements on gender, work and the family, comparing Scotland with England, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Europe as whole. Reactions to statement 2 confirm that the Scots no longer believe in the ideal of the home-centred female. There is a clear contrast with the Republic of Ireland where the slower, more recent expansion of women's employment is reflected in a smaller shift in views. Statements 3 and 4 suggest that an important reason for the collapse of male breadwinner ideology is simply what respondents see as economic necessity: even respondents sympathetic to the ideal of a woman at home ministering to her husband and children agree that women have to work, and should contribute to the income of the household. Again this is what we might expect if there is indeed a connection between the expansion of women's employment and a change in people's views.

Consistent with their lack of belief in male breadwinner ideology, the Scots are less likely to think that women's employment has adverse effects on the family. In particular they are less likely to think that young children are disadvantaged by having a working mother. What we cannot tell from such responses, of course, is the reasons why respondents give them, and these could describe a wide variety of different gender relations. Some respondents could be positive about women's employment because they believe it implies a re-division of domestic labour, such that both partners make a roughly equal contribution to childcare and other domestic work on the one hand, and employment on the other. Others might imagine that women's employment still leaves them capable of performing much the same amount of domestic labour and childcare as before - resulting in a 'double shift' for women rather than a more egalitarian division of both paid and unpaid work. However, as I will discuss below, it appears that the expansion of women's employment is also connected to the expansion of men's domestic labour.

Statements 8 and 9 show almost universal support for paid maternity leave (even higher in Ireland than in Britain) and substantial support for childcare benefits for dual-earner families. This implies that there is some support for the idea that the state should redistribute resources towards families who currently have dependent children, and that both parents should be able to continue with their careers. We might see this as a recognition that tax and welfare systems need to adjust to the demise of the male breadwinner system. Working parents of young children face the directly competing demands of both time to care for them and money to pay for them. Transfers across the life cycle, from younger and older workers with fewer family obligations, seem one possible solution.

Differences in attitudes across the different nations that comprise Ireland and the UK are not very large, except that respondents in the Republic of Ireland are rather more likely to support male breadwinner ideology and take a negative view of the implications of mothers working: again, a pattern we might expect given the relatively lower level of women's employment in Ireland, and its later development.

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Table 4
Views on work and the family

% of respondents agreeing	Scotland	England	Wales	Northern Ireland	Republic of Ireland	Europe
1 A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.	19	25	26	27	35	30
2 A job is all right, but what a woman really wants is a home and children.	21	25	39	33	51	37
3 Most women have to work these days to support their families.	76	77	88	84	85	71
4 Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income.	63	61	65	71	77	72
5 A working mother can establish just as warm and secure relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.	71	64	64	66	62	68
6 A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.	17	42	34	37	49	56
7 All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.	23	35	28	35	52	52
8 Working women should receive paid maternity leave when they have a baby.	85	84	85	95	95	90
9 Families should receive financial benefits for child care when both parents work.	54	42	60	52	52	49
n unweighted	86	849	49	647	938	15806
n weighted	88	861	52	652		16033

Note: respondents could either 'agree strongly', 'agree', 'disagree' 'disagree strongly' or 'neither agree or disagree' with the statements presented to them. Thus the balance of each percentage shown in the table includes both respondents who explicitly disagreed or disagreed strongly with a statement and those (between 10 and 15% in most cases) who said that they 'neither agreed or disagreed'. In this table and table 5 'n unweighted' refers to the total number of respondents in the country concerned who gave a response to at least one of the statements. 'n weighted' refers to the number of respondents once weights have been applied by national survey organisations as appropriate. Results for Europe were further weighted so that the number of respondents reflected the relative size of the adult populations of the countries included.

Table 5 shows respondents' views on marriage, divorce, children and reproductive rights. The Scots, along with the rest of the British, and indeed the rest of Europe, still believe in marriage, and this belief is even stronger in Ireland. However they also believe in divorce. Even in the Republic of Ireland, where divorce does not officially exist, half the respondents agreed that it was the best solution for couples with insoluble problems! This fits with other knowledge we have about the changing nature of marriage, such as the increase in rates of cohabitation prior to marriage (linked to large rises in illegitimacy rates) and in divorce rates.

Table 5
Views on marriage, divorce, children and reproductive rights

% of respondents agreeing	Scotland	England	Wales	Northern Ireland	Republic of Ireland	Europe
People who want children ought to get married.	54	59	59	71	72	57
Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage problems.	60	55	47	56	51	68
When there are children in the family, parents should stay together even if they don't get along.	14	23	18	27	35	26
Even when there are no children, a married couple should stay together even if they don't get along.	2	5	12	10	10	8
One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together.	35	36	37	38	47	38
A pregnant woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion for any reason whatsoever, if she chooses not to have the baby.	48	51	50	32	28	54
n unweighted	86	849	49	647	938	15806
n weighted	88	861	52	652		16033

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Only about a third of respondents in Scotland thought that a single parent could bring up a child as well as two. This was one of only two statements where the views of men differed from those of women in Scotland (although we should keep in mind the small sample size here, which makes all but the most substantial differences difficult to detect). As table 6 shows, women were much more positive about single parents than men. This perhaps reflects two things. The first is the fact that nine out of ten single parents are women, and we might expect them to have more faith in the abilities of fellow women. The second, more speculatively, is the controversy over the rights and duties of divorced and separated fathers, where some men have argued that the law privileges women. It might be that some men's dissatisfaction with current arrangements for deciding on custody and access to children of separated parents leads them to criticise single parenthood.

Table 6
One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together

%	Disagree	N.a.n.d.*	Agree	(n)
Male	53	26	21	38
Female	34	19	47	48
All	43	22	35	86

**Neither agree nor disagree.*

Pearson Chi-Square Significance .036

Finally, respondents views on abortion (an issue which arose in discussing the jurisdiction of the new Scottish parliament) do not appear to differ much between Scotland and the rest of Britain, with around a half of respondents agreeing with abortion on demand. Support for abortion was substantially lower in both parts of Ireland however, reflecting both the strength of religious feeling there, and the fact that abortion is illegal in the Republic of Ireland .

Only one other statement produced a significant difference between men and women in Scotland. As table 7 shows, while both men and women supported cohabitation, more women than men were opposed to it. However, as I discuss in the Appendix, older women were over represented in the Scottish survey sample. Since this is an issue where attitudes become much more conservative with age, it may be that what appears to be a difference of

attitudes on the basis of sex may in fact be influenced by the different average ages of the men and women in the sample.

Table 7
It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married

%	Disagree	N.a.n.d.*	Agree	(n)
Male	11	21	69	38
Female	35	15	51	50
All	24	17	58	88

**Neither agree nor disagree.*

Pearson Chi-Square Significance .033

CONCLUSIONS

The first conclusion to draw from this survey is that attitudes towards gender in Scotland are not conservative whether we compare them to the rest of the UK or to Europe as whole: on the contrary, if anything they are slightly more egalitarian, at least in the sense that support for the idea of different roles for men and women in the home and at work is low. In turn, this fits with the wider pattern of attitudes towards gender in Europe, where there is a relationship between the development of women's employment on the one hand and the development of more egalitarian gender attitudes on the other. Women's employment in Scotland (and in Britain as a whole) is above the European average, and attitudes towards a variety of gender issues are also rather more egalitarian. The second conclusion is that the views of men and women in Scotland are very similar. Again this reflects a wider European pattern, whereby gender attitudes divide far more by age, educational level, family work history experience and country than by sex. At least as regards their attitudes towards the specific set of gender issues discussed above, Scotsman are neither more 'macho' than their peers in Europe, nor, it would appear, much more macho than their sisters at home! (But clearly 'macho' embraces a lot more than attitudes towards work and family.)

These conclusions ought to be tempered by the caveat that attitudes need not translate automatically into behaviour. A number of studies of couples have shown that some men's and women's belief in equality has more impact on the way they describe their behaviour than on the behaviour itself (Backett 1987;

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Hochschild 1990). Roles which continue to be unequal come to be interpreted as equal so as to conform to the couple's self image. But we should also be wary of concluding that the only thing which has changed is ideas. Gershuny, for example, has shown that as women's participation in work has expanded, so too has men's contribution to domestic labour, so that, over the last quarter century, men in Europe now perform around two fifths whereas previously they did about one quarter (Gershuny, Godwin and Jones 1994, p.173). Similarly, other results from the ISSP survey (MacInnes 1998b) suggest that there is a close correlation between the overall level of women's employment in a country and the proportion of at least some household tasks (such as shopping, laundry or caring for family members) which is done by men.

It appears that such factors as the age of respondents, their level of education, the country in which they live, and in particular their experience of women's employment, are stronger influences on their views about gender and employment than what sex they happen to be. This is a pattern we find across Western Europe. In turn it appears that these views reflect respondents' experience and behaviour. In countries where women's employment is higher, support for male breadwinner ideology is lower. The dramatic variation in views according to age is probably due to the substantial increase in women's employment in Europe over the last forty years, which has shaped younger women's views and also made it less easy for their partners or sons to think of them primarily as homemakers or mothers.

Since we have some evidence that suggests that these differences in attitude according to age are a generational effect rather than a life cycle one - that it is not explained by people adopting more conservative views as they grow older - it seems that a fairly rapid sea change in views is occurring, and that this change reflects an equally substantial material change: the demise of the male breadwinner system. The latter was simultaneously a sexual division of labour between paid and unpaid work, and between production and reproduction. This enabled firms (at the cost of paying a family wage) to command the commitment of male employees who were not only unfettered by domestic obligations, but supported and serviced by their families. It enabled states to rely on the family wage and mothers' domestic and childcare work to sustain the rate of reproduction (the fertility rate). It enabled families to combine paid and unpaid work through a simple but patriarchal division of labour, which demanded that the husband worked for pay but gave him economic control, confined wives to the home and subordinated the family to his work or career. The decline of the male breadwinner system thus faces employers, families and states with a series of new problems. Until they are addressed, families, especially those with young children, will struggle to reconcile the irreconcilable demands of career and family.

There is much contemporary discussion about the 'crisis' in masculinity. Insofar as the evidence presented here suggests that change in gender attitudes reflects an underlying process of substantial social and economic change, then we would do better to see this as a crisis in the material position of men rather than in their gender identity. Young Scottish men, like their peers across Europe, may still be able to take for granted a vast array of privilege compared to young women: more parental support, better chances in the labour market and higher education, less risk of sexual assault. They do not have to routinely endure the misogynist attitudes or casual discrimination young women face: on the contrary they may often be the perpetrators of that. Scottish parks are not yet full of men pushing prams (though they are a far more common sight than even a decade ago) and public bars in Govan hardly echo to the sound of men discussing recipes, but there are other indicators of change. Young Scottish women now outperform their male counterparts at school - another European-wide trend. They may soon do so in higher education too. Will these increasingly highly qualified young women happily accept the role of subordinate housewife in the future? Will their employers let them? Thus men may still enjoy advantages and privileges over women, but to nothing like the extent their fathers or grandfathers could take for granted. The macho Scotsman, like his counterparts across Europe, is not yet a dying breed, but he is trapped in the quicksand of social and economic change. The 'crisis' of masculinity is only the obverse of the significant material success of feminism in bringing greater equality between men and women.

This is not the place to spell out a general theory of masculinity which addresses all the questions raised by these findings, but there is a final issue which merits discussion. Much of the existing literature on gender treats masculinity or femininity as empirically existing gender identities which men and women possess (because they have been socialised into them) and which influence their attitudes or behaviour and thus help to reproduce a society marked by inequality between men and women. For example masculinity is imagined to give men an instrumental orientation to life which encourages them to prioritise work over family, and brings them the corresponding material advantages. But it is difficult to square such a model with the evidence presented here, in that 'gender' attitudes, at least on the issues we have analysed, seem to be a function of age or nationality rather than sex. I have attempted to discuss the concept of masculinity in greater depth elsewhere (MacInnes 1988a), but two key points are directly relevant here. We can make more sense of the evidence presented in this article if we stop thinking of masculinity as an actually existing gender identity that men possess which determines their attitudes or behaviour. Rather we should see

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masculinity as an ideology, or way of interpreting the world, which imagines that men have just such an identity. It contains a set of ideas about what men ought to be like, that would rationalise why men and women end up with such different social and economic roles and such contrasting amounts of power resources and status in a world where all human beings, regardless of their sex, are supposed to be formally equal.

Another way of considering this point is simply to recognise that the survey results presented here tell us nothing about any empirically existing gender identities unless we smuggle in a vital piece of unacknowledged biological determinism: that our male respondents only possess masculinity and our female ones femininity. No-one, ever, studies the relationship between masculines and feminines. Nor is this a drawback if we consider that it is actually sex rather than gender that we are ultimately interested in, if we wish to understand and challenge inequality between men and women. Gender may sometimes be a concept that hinders rather than helps our analysis.

APPENDIX

The survey 'Family and Changing Gender Roles II' was administered to some thirty three thousand respondents in 18 countries world-wide (including countries from the former Soviet Union, North America and Australasia) by national survey research organisations, and deposited in the UK ESRC Data Archive, University of Essex, and documented and made available by the Zentralarchiv Fur Empirische Sozialforschung, Köln, Germany. The data presented here are from the author's analyses. Neither those who carried out the original collection and organisation of the data, nor the ESRC Data Archive, nor the Zentralarchiv bear any responsibility for the interpretation I have placed on it here. The countries used here are: Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Spain, Germany (including the former East Germany), the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Austria and Italy.

86 respondents from the achieved random sample for the survey were in Scotland; however they were not very representative of the age or sex structure of the adult Scottish population as table A1 (on the next page) shows. In particular men were underrepresented and older women over represented. Table A2 for England shows the more representative sample achieved there. SCPR who carried out the fieldwork weighted the sample achieved to take account of the differences in the chance of selection that different types of respondent would have had. The effects of this weighting on the Scottish sample are shown in table A3. It makes the sample more representative of the age and sex structure of the Scottish population than the unweighted one, but still leaves women over represented.

Table A1
Age Group in Decades by Sex: Scotland, unweighted n and percentages within rows

Age in years	Male	Female	All
under30	4	7	11
	36.4	63.6	12.9
30's	8	14	22
	36.4	63.6	25.9
40's	5	9	14
	35.7	64.3	16.5
50's	11	8	19
	57.9	42.1	22.4
60+	4	15	19
	21.1	78.9	22.4
All	32	53	85
	37.6	62.4	100.0

Table A2
Age Group in Decades by Sex: England, unweighted n and percentages within rows

Age in years	Male	Female	All
under30	77	83	160
	48.1	51.9	18.8
30's	99	93	192
	51.6	48.4	22.6
40's	59	84	143
	41.3	58.7	16.8
50's	52	60	112
	46.4	53.6	13.2
60+	105	137	242
	43.4	56.6	28.5
All	392	457	849
	46.2	53.8	100.0

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Table A3
Age Group in Decades by Sex: Scotland, weighted n and percentages within rows

Age in years	Male	Female	All
under30	6	8	15
	42.9	57.1	16.9
30's	10	15	25
	40.4	59.6	28.3
40's	6	7	13
	47.9	52.1	15.1
50's	13	9	21
	58.3	41.7	24.6
60+	3	10	13
	24.0	76.0	15.1
All	38	49	87
	43.9	56.1	100.0

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