

FIXING THE TERMS OF STATELESSNESS - AGAIN

Wesley Edwards

Civics as an art has to do, not with imagining an impossible [utopia] where all is well, but with making the most and best of each and every place, and especially of the city in which we live.

Patrick Geddes (quoted. in Miller 1989, p.148)

A decade ago the political geographer John Agnew developed in the book **Place and Politics** (1987a) a provocative theory of place in the social sciences. Drawing empirical material from the electoral geography of both the United States and Scotland, Agnew sought to elevate place into a fundamental social science concept. This task, ambitiously and creatively undertaken and supported by careful political analysis of the two nations, was Agnew's effort to reconcile the statism prevalent in contemporary political inquiry with the conceptual challenge of spatial relations increasingly prominent in the work of geographers.

It is quite understandable that a scholar with so great an interest in the intersection of place and politics would choose to focus attention on modern Scotland, for there is perhaps no better setting in which to observe how the aspirations and definitions of place and varied conceptions of local identity are expressed through and transformed by politics. If 'political behavior is intrinsically geographical' (Agnew 1987a, p.6), that nature may be seen clearly in the course of Scottish politics. It is worth reconsidering Agnew's contribution at this moment in Scottish history, while Scotland seeks to redefine itself politically, as a means of understanding the political challenges facing both Edinburgh and London. In his work Agnew draws equally on politics in Scotland and politics in the United States. Thus, I will consider part of his discussion of American urban places and draw a rough comparison

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about spatial diversity, political marginality, and the role of the state. Although Agnew sought to direct scholarship away from the central-state level and grounded his research in local places, his work does more to underscore the abiding territorial interest of the state and the spatially uneven distribution of political power in industrial democracies than it does to demonstrate place-specific relationships. The conflict of state power and local preferences is unusually well-known in Scotland and is unavoidable even as Scotland pursues constitutional reform. The conflict is also central to the experience of contemporary American cities.

AGNEW'S SOCIAL SCIENCE OF PLACE

In **Place and Politics** Professor Agnew works conceptually and empirically toward a social science in which place is the central concept. His central, motivating theoretical question is: How do we reason about social and political change as a matter of place? What is the proper scale for inquiry about social and political change? Specifically, as we observe change, might we see it differently if we modify our scale? Instead of investigating endlessly the machinations of the state and national-level institutions, as most political scientists and political sociologists have typically done, Agnew argues that scholars should look beneath that single level. Theories that suggest the progressive nationalization and spatial invariability of social and political behaviour would then be rejected. Contemporary states, increasingly unable to manage a global economy (or, in his phrasing, 'the world-economy' or *économie-monde*) remain the focus of most social-science inquiry, at the expense of an understanding of local political attachments and contexts. Instead of looking primarily at the state, Agnew interprets global or macro-level social and political change in industrialized nations through changes rooted in and expressed at the sub-state, micro-level (see Agnew and Duncan 1989, pp.1-8). It is his study of politics at this level that leads him to argue for significant variation among the places of a nation, not national uniformity of political behaviour or belief or unilinear tracks of modernization or development (see Agnew 1987b). He contends that place-specific factors and patterns of interaction produce patterns of political behaviour and, more than this, that politics happens both in and through places, altering both. Thus, place is important regardless of local outcomes or aggregate patterns. To Agnew, place is

the geographical context or locality in which agency interpellates social structure. Consequently, political behavior is viewed as the product of agency as structured by the historically constituted social contexts in

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which people live their lives - in a word, places.
(1987a, p.43)

Drawing from Giddens' theory of structuration, Agnew provides a conceptual linkage of the global and the local by suggesting that place is the structuring and mediating context for social relations. It is a process of structuration, a foundation of identity, as well as a locale - and, to Agnew, it is much more than an analytical conceit.

The place-based perspective leads Agnew to view the state in this way:

Territorial states are made up of places in which the social relations upon which social and political order depend are constituted. Places ... do not exist independently, but as sets of places interrelated by state-building and associated social practices. State and society are not autonomous and separable therefore.
(1987a, p.x)

Thus, state legitimacy - and the resistance to it within a society - are best seen in the histories of places, not in universal changes, national activity, or even individual motivations and preferences (Agnew 1987a, p.1), though these may be interpreted through place. The formation of place is inextricably bound up in the formation of states, economies, politics, and so on - and vice versa. State and place exist in a formative, evolving interdependence and tension. It is with this conceptual outline in mind that Agnew turns to his descriptions of politics in the United States and Scotland. In particular, he uses this approach to explain the course of Scottish nationalism in the 1970s and 80s and to show how American electoral behavior is shaped by and through place-specific commitments.

THE UNEXPECTED VARIETY OF SCOTTISH NATIONALISM

Agnew insists upon the 'interpenetration of place and Scottish politics,' claiming that "'mass" political behavior is intrinsically geographical' and structured by place (1987a, p.167). Because ideas of class-consciousness, 'Britishness,' and 'Scottishness' coexist in different ways in different places at different times (Agnew 1987a, ch.8), political parties must make place-specific appeals and weave their mobilization efforts into the lived experience of people in local places. These place-specific efforts produce spatial variations in the roots of political activity, not one clear national pattern that holds true in every place. In other words, the success of the Scottish National Party in two different venues in the same election cycle may have depended

on two different kinds of electoral appeal by the party, with each geared to a different political context of place. In Agnew's view (based on data from the 1970s and 80s), there are many Scotlands or Scottish places, but three are most easily and usefully discernible (1987a, pp.140-41). In one, SNP nationalism faces a steady commitment to class-based politics (as exemplified in Strathclyde). In a second, SNP-style nationalism is well-established (as in Tayside, Grampian, and Galloway) and will maintain its partisan significance. In the third, the SNP faces a more fluid and volatile politics, but it can expect to survive there (as seen in the Highlands). Many other areas of Scotland, like the Borders and Lothian, do not fit easily into one of these categories, but the three major patterns are distinct enough (or, at least they were through the early 1980s; more recent election results have been confounding, and so follow-up studies are now needed).

Agnew supplements electoral data with detailed local case studies of Glasgow, the Western Isles, and Dundee and Peterhead to suggest the different electoral bases and partisan appeals of the Scottish National Party in these areas, to illustrate 'the links between the changing fortunes of places and parties in places' (1987a, p.159), and to underscore the variable political meaning of place in shaping larger developments. In this view, Scottish nationalism was hampered by its own success. SNP became a less forceful political force for the nationalist cause because the party was internally divided and conflicted (cf. Woods 1995). If the party had trouble distinguishing itself coherently from the Conservatives, the Alliance, and, especially, Labour in the early 1980s, it was because the nationalism that won votes in Glasgow was not the same nationalism that won votes elsewhere in Scotland in the same period. In fact, within the party, place-based conceptions of nationalism conflicted, very often on the basis of class.

Agnew contends that explanations of partisan support other than the one provided by the place perspective are incomplete. Whatever the merits of this claim, I would seek to underscore a point about the political identity of Scotland that Agnew understates, namely Scotland as a peripheral nation within the United Kingdom. One historian has written of concentric rings of territorial identity in Scotland intersected by non-territorial shafts. A mythic popular history and distinctive Scottish institutions help maintain a sense of Scottish identity that does not coincide with identification with the British state (Smout 1994, p.111). These concentric loyalties, especially to state and nation, have coexisted for some time, with the conflicting demands of territorial diversity and parliamentary unity in Great Britain played out in territorial politics (Keating and Jones 1991, pp.311-13). The British state has been able to manage the periphery through policy and patronage without calling into serious question the foundation or integrity of the centralized

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state, but Scotland and Wales have remained separated from the political center (Keating and Jones 1991, p.313). Agnew suggests that Britain's successful territorial management (not counting Northern Ireland) may be due to the Scottish nationalists' inability to maintain a coherent coalition made up of the diverse interests, attitudes, and motivations of Scottish places supporting the SNP. However, in this century, Scottish nationalism has always been tied into larger political struggles in Britain, with the parties outside Scotland largely favouring the status quo.

The effort of the centre has been to quash peripheral dissent or to manage the diverse claims in policy (see Keating 1994); the result in Scotland has been only to deepen a sizable anti-English feeling, to encourage Scottish civic distinctiveness, and to make the quality or existence of Union a central question in both Scottish and British politics. The SNP cannot rally a majority in Scotland, but, more importantly, the position of the party of Union has steadily deteriorated (up to the stunning outcome in 1997). In a place where the bounds of state and nation do not coincide, political identity is unresolved, but it leans toward dissent and scepticism of the centre - and this is a broad quality that mitigates or coexists with the place-based disunity observed by Agnew. As David McCrone has written persuasively, Scotland is a 'stateless nation'. The terms of Scottish statelessness, though, seem mutable and endlessly negotiable in politics - but more fitted to the exigencies of London than to the demands of Edinburgh. Experience has brought watchfulness.

POLITICAL LESSONS FROM URBAN AMERICA

Agnew extends his analysis by considering the application of his ideas to American electoral behaviour. Paralleling the empirical material on Scottish politics, this section contains both a description of aggregate political affairs as well as studies of several local places in the United States. Of these, the two on urban American places, namely Detroit and Miami, are of greatest interest. (The other sections, which will not be discussed here, concern realignment theory, American sectionalism, and non-urban areas.) Agnew suggests that the progressive decomposition of American political parties and the uneven nature of growth across states and metropolitan areas demonstrate the continuing importance of place in the structuring of political life (1987a, p.189). He notes an increasing diversity and competition within and between American metropolitan areas (cities vs. suburbs, regions vs. regions, in a contest for economic growth) and a related decline of sectionalism as a robust explanatory concept (cf. Bense 1984). Urban life in the United States, increasingly segregated by class and race and party, indeed suggests the

diversity and political significance of place, but it also reveals the territorial motivations of the central state, the spatially uneven distribution of political power that the state supports, and the basic unevenness of the conflict between central power and local preferences.

Detroit, which Agnew calls America's Glasgow, is presented as the urban embodiment of the automobile industry. The organization of urban space in Detroit has followed the organization and vitality of the global automobile industry (Agnew 1987a, pp.191-99). Thus, decline of the global position of American automobile companies was followed by urban decay in the city that is properly called the Motor City. The decay and depopulation of Detroit dampened the fortunes of the New Deal Democratic Party, which had traditionally relied on the labour vote and local political organizations in the urban industrial north for support and party mobilization. In turn, challenges to the party and its pro-urban policies became more successful. Detroit's modern transformations stand in contrast to the contemporary development of Miami. In Agnew's account, Miami and South Florida are the new urban America, built on the service sector rather than manufacturing and populated by a mixture of middle-class Northern retirees and entrepreneurs and immigrants from Latin America. Miami's growth has typically followed US-Latin American relations, with the city booming as trade and diplomacy between the Americas grew and with local party politics in Miami greatly influenced by the issue of US policy toward the Castro regime in Cuba (Agnew 1987a, pp.208-13).

As he did with his treatment of Scottish nationalism, Agnew again demonstrates in his consideration of the evolution of American urban places the vitality and diversity of place. He is correct to suggest that the changes in the global economy that led to the decline of heavy manufacturing in many American cities simultaneously fueled a suburban-led service-sector boom in other cities. Thus, at the same time that some cities were facing growing unemployment and deep fiscal strain, other cities and suburbs were struggling to develop effective growth strategies. Indeed, Miami's growth is best observed alongside Detroit's decline. It should be underscored, though, that this pattern of urban deindustrialization and suburbanization was accompanied by a decline of positive urban policy from the national government. The urban policies of the New Deal era, providing aid for housing and economic development, were largely dismantled or de-funded by the incoming Reagan Administration in 1981 (see, inter alia, Wolman 1990). Reagan's domestic policy was skewed toward the suburbs and the growing Sunbelt, where his own electoral fortunes lay. Reagan also proved willing to accept the spatial distribution of economic growth and decline as it occurred, even though the changes left many Rustbelt cities in severe distress. Urban

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opposition was clear but diffuse. When urban policy was cut, a whole class of welfare-state claimants was cut, one whose loyalties to the Democratic Party were great.

A range of literature on urban issues that has been widely discussed (much of it only after the publication of Agnew's book) has deepened the understanding of the consequences of urban deindustrialization. The work of sociologist William Julius Wilson (1987) has highlighted the presence of pockets of persistent urban poverty in old industrial cities in the United States. Wilson suggests that there are places of concentrated, long-term unemployment - largely beyond the hold of the labour market and current social policy. The transformation of the employment base of the city has created islands of deep and sustained poverty - a poverty that strikes young African American and Hispanic males to a greater degree than other groups. As middle and upper classes depart, the city becomes more sharply segregated by race and class and isolation and labor-force detachment increase. This kind of urban poverty may be altogether new (see Katz 1995, ch.2). Indeed, the sociologist Loïc Wacquant has argued (1996) that the severe ghettoization and intense urban poverty Wilson describes represent a new kind of 'advanced marginality' in industrialized nations. What seems clear from this body of research is that there are urban places where the life chances of many people are sharply, and tragically, limited. This recent literature on urban poverty suggests that broad-scale economic transformation strikes the already vulnerable with greatest impact; the communities where they live become places of high economic and social vulnerability, where the operation of policies and markets is rarely salubrious, if they are present at all.

If Agnew were writing a new edition of **Place and Politics**, he would no doubt encounter the developments in this literature, for they suggest that the already-heterogeneous set of large American cities is becoming more so. Segregation by class and race in American metropolitan areas remains high (see Massey and Denton 1993), while fiscal disparities between central cities and suburbs have persisted. Compounding the economic and fiscal problems of many central cities is the declining political power of cities at the state and national levels. Urban interests, once key parts of the Democratic coalition, have now become junior members of a Democratic Party that, like New Labour, has moved quickly to the pro-middle-class political centre. Urban policy interests are represented in Washington by a Department of Housing and Urban Development that also oversees programmes encouraging middle-class home-ownership. Post-war suburbanization, urban deindustrialization, and the steady down-grading and de-funding of American urban policy have helped leave old industrial cities - particularly their poorest neighborhoods - economically and politically isolated, with African Americans and Hispanics

greatly over-represented among the ranks of the urban poor and jobless (see Weir 1995).

As places, many central-city neighbourhoods in old industrial cities stand in growing contrast not only to other urban neighbourhoods and peripheral suburban areas but also to more prosperous urban districts in other American cities and to urban boom areas around the world. Despite general economic growth, many inner cities in the United States find themselves now in political isolation and economic distress in part because it was politically convenient and possible to alter policy in the early 1980s away from distributive aid to large cities and redistributive aid to their residents and in part because the local needs of American cities have become so heterogeneous that a clear 'urban' agenda is hard to define in Washington. Distributive politics can cover a multitude of sins, but American cities in an age of domestic policy austerity and devolution have found themselves excluded from political grace.

RECONSIDERING THE POLITICS OF PLACE

Agnew's objective in **Place and Politics** was to provide a cogent theoretical justification of the place perspective and to demonstrate its utility by examining political problems using this approach. However, linking global change to local social relations and the 'process' of place is no easy empirical matter (see Agnew 1987a, p.213). If politics happens both in and through places, how is a researcher to observe and interpret the transformation of place? Can this concept of the politics of place be converted into meaningful empirical studies? The challenge for research is to map a thousand different local logics of place, to capture the consequential evolution of each one, and to make 'mediation' something visible and comprehensible, from which hypotheses may be drawn and tested. The possibility of meaningful generalization seems remote and perhaps even antithetical to the place perspective altogether.

The application by Agnew himself is not the clearest guide. The studies of Scotland and the United States, which are a meeting of political sociology and electoral geography, are well-constructed, but they lack the novelty of Agnew's conceptual work and provide only incomplete answers to these questions. **Place and Politics** is part social theory, part theory of historical state development, part critique of political sociology, part geographer's treatise on the value of place in social science, and part empirical study of political parties and voting behavior. These elements are combined with skill and considerable erudition, but, inevitably given the scope of Agnew's

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project, they fit together uneasily, leaving the major theoretical aims only incompletely supported. Most importantly, it is still unclear how mediation in and through place actually works.

However, there is great merit in rereading **Place and Politics** now, as Scotland builds a new political arrangement within the United Kingdom and as traditional views of the nation-state continue to erode around the world. In short, reading Agnew reminds us that the diversity of place constitutes an ongoing territorial challenge to the integrity of the centralized state. Febvre's dictum - 'L'Etat n'est jamais donné, il est toujours forgé' ['the state is never just given, it is always made'] (quoted in Agnew 1987a, p.1) - applies even now, suggesting how central power exists in tension with the demands and preferences of diverse local places, as expressed through politics. Agnew set out to offer a corrective to social science's often uncritical attention to the state; instead of focusing intently on the building of the 'modern' national state, Agnew suggests a reconsideration of the local. Politics in this perspective is seen in how local communities mediate state action and shape political identity and participation. The ambition to view state and local as a reinforcing place-based process can be only partly achieved at this stage.

Agnew shows clearly the differentiation of local places, but by extension, he also demonstrates the territorial challenge of the state and the inherently uneven distribution of political gains and patronage. Detroit cannot be viewed as a self-constructed city: it is more properly seen in a context that shows its relation to other cities, to its surrounding suburbs, and to regions around the world. Moreover, it should be seen in the context of both economic change and public policy. The state's relationship with individual places is uneven, contingent, and contentious. The central state depends upon legitimacy, consent, and participation within its territory (Agnew 1987a). Sustaining this legitimate dominance requires some active linkage between the central state and local places; but, as Agnew observes, the state is not even-handed: its mercies and punishments, its demands and rewards, fall unequally over the territory. The challenge of the regime or coalition governing the centralized state is to retain enough support and legitimacy to sustain its rule credibly and legally (not to discuss the violent and extra-legal means of retaining power) and to maintain territorial penetration and integrity. As long as it is successful, the distribution of largesse and sanction will remain its choice. Its policies will always carry a bias of several kinds. As Agnew puts it, 'places which are nonsupportive or in the minority suffer the consequences. ... Some places are expendable because political power and the balance of representation have shifted in favor of other places' (1987a, pp.39-41).

Politics entails favouritism. In the practice of politics, the winner gets to distribute the rewards of winning, or at least those that can be easily reallocated. Scotland needs no reminder of this fact; neither do urban mayors. Agnew appropriates the term hegemony: 'under conditions of economic and political inequality between places, a hegemony can only be maintained by pursuing policies with geographical consequences and place-biased policies that favor those people and places that favor the hegemony' (1987a, p.39). How a regime extends its power depends on political choice as well as formal constitutional structure; invariably, though, the effort has uneven territorial consequences. Some places join the favoured circle; others remain on the periphery. Most move back and forth over time, but some places - like Wilson's urban neighbourhoods - find themselves persistently excluded from the benefits of power.

The laws, norms, and rights of citizenship that have developed with the rise of the modern centralized state (see Tilly 1990) suggest a rough equality of places, with each place and person, in theory, standing within equal reach of the state. However, ideas of citizenship in practice are hardly absolute (see Poggi 1990, pp.142-3). The play of politics ensures that coalitions and regimes will use the institutional power of the state to their own partisan advantage, seeking the maintenance of their legitimate power to rule. Maintaining a coalition through patronage, though, may produce flawed policy and weak law (see Lowi 1979, especially ch. 9) and work at odds with the idea of equal citizenship. The bond linking state and territory to create the contemporary centralized state entails not just developing rights of citizenship and the nationalization of political forms but also patronage and coercion (see Tilly 1990; see also Mann's (1993) reading of Weber and 'the caged nation' and his distinctions between the infrastructural and despotic power of the state).

The conflicts of a centralized state with institutional, territorial, and political interests lead it to pursue complicated, often contradictory policies, not the pure expression of equal citizenship rights. State actors very often choose to tie together the territorial and the political by actively excluding or disfavoring some interests and places. There are varieties and degrees of inclusion/exclusion. Because the state is both the wielder of legal coercion and the base of partisan governance, each place's relationship to the central state is likely to be different. There are likely to be Detroit's as well as suburban Macomb County, Michigan's. More than this, though, political alignments may mean that some places stand excluded longer and more consistently than others, as the governing regime is able to find a steady balance of the legal, territorial, and political that it finds acceptable over

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many years. Thus, Detroit may deteriorate and many of its neighborhoods may continue to exhibit the patterns Wilson describes.

The recent histories of Scotland and the urban United States suggest that both have a relatively weak structural position and a very contingent political position. The constitutional issues are of course very different in the United States and Great Britain, but in both settings politics has worked to peripheralize particular places. The urban United States, at the bottom of the federal structure, has been shaped by Reagan-era policy withdrawal formed by and favoring suburban Republican interests. Meanwhile, in Thatcher-era Britain, local government, answerable to Parliament, was highly politicized, to the disadvantage of opposition parties, and Scotland was denied the validity of its distinctive civic impulse and its strain of nationalism. The aim of central assertion and the diminution of the power of local governments was to undercut the base of the opposition. The Conservatives' unwillingness to cede ground to Scottish nationalism - or to recognize the popular support in Scotland for constitutional reform (Lynch 1996) - was another strike against a vocal opposition. Federalism and social policy devolution will create even more variance at local levels in the United States, while the debate over constitutional reform and subnational government in Scotland is likely never to be resolved in full (see Keating 1988; Nairn 1997; Midwinter and McVicar 1996; Brown et al 1996). But the political-territorial alignments in both cases have proved to be crucial - signaling the end of the New Deal era and the end of the postwar settlement and the beginning of a period of more conservative governance.

The challenge of modern Scotland is almost opposite that of American cities. For the middle part of this century, American cities negotiated distributive benefits from Washington to hold together diverse local coalitions. For the most part, they were co-winners in a national coalition with Southern Democrats that allowed them to reap fruits from the American welfare state. Interest groups developed to speak for a legitimate big-city constituency in Washington; the real diversity among city needs was accommodated by the calculus of distributive politics or papered over. Urban policy was viewed in part as compensation for the structure of federalism. The limitations of this system were reached in the late 1970s, as the interests of cities began to diverge sharply and as conservative critiques of the American welfare state became more forceful. Since then, cities have been unable or unwilling to submerge their differences and appeal to Washington as a single urban (let alone, metropolitan) constituency. In the American federal structure, cities moved from being politically powerful to being marginalized and left to their own devices in an age of domestic-policy austerity and devolution to the states. However, their future will still be partly written in Washington - where

success depends on how they are able to make unified policy appeals or win particularistic gains from Congress - and partly in city halls, state houses, and neighbourhoods - where success depends on how wisely they use local resources and exploit their distinctiveness.

Scotland's challenge is also formidable. In this century it has played the politics of peripherality, its challenge to manage its own marginality in London, to use British territorial politics to advantage, and to maximize compensation for statelessness. The issue of constitutional reform unified Scotland to some degree against an intrusive state. Now, though, Scotland must create a political order that is viable in London and satisfactory to the diverse claimants who will gather in Edinburgh. With greater control over its own destiny, Scotland must protect its own place within the reformed Union as well as hew out political outcomes acceptable to diverse Scottish interests and consistent with its distinctive political culture and democratic identity (see Fairley 1995). Scotland's external politics will remain a 'negotiated compromise' with London (see Brown et al 1996, pp.36, 219), but the diversity of place that Agnew notes - including the ever-present strain of Scottish nationalism - will make politics in Scotland more internally and openly contentious than it has been.

WHITHER SCOTLAND?

Scotland and Scottish places exist in an on-going, if uncomfortable, negotiation with Westminster. Even with reform, Scotland will continue to live in some sort of contentious dialectic with London - and it will remain an example of the persistent conflict between centralized state power and local political identity. Scotland is large enough for a strong voice and critical dissent there, but it is not large enough or unified enough to dictate terms. Short of outright independence, the political problem for Scotland will be what it is and has been - fixing the terms of Scottish statelessness in Great Britain. The problem is negotiating the territorial interest of the state and the spatially uneven distribution of political power in industrial democracies - a distribution that has been skewed since Union to give Scotland and Scottish parties only some of the voice and autonomy they want.

Scotland's ever-changing political identity will be determined by political exchange beyond constitutional reform. In this engagement and negotiation, the needs of the governing coalition or regime in London will ensure that the Scottish question, in its current iteration, will be answered to its own advantage. As the latest UK election has shown, Scotland as a political issue will always be a useful political tool (see Lynch 1996). Even though since the

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1970s, Labour's commitment to Scottish devolution is said to be 'long term, detailed and entrenched' (Lynch 1996), reform for Scotland remains fundamentally a political variable, contingent on politics in the wider realm. Labour's own trajectory to support of reform for Scotland has been uneven .

The challenge for Scotland is, as it shall be, to fix the terms of its own exclusion - to get the best that can be got under current political alignments and to develop a prescience about how those alignments might change. However, it is also to keep the internal contest from damaging the external one. There is the possibility of beginning a new era of Scottish peripheralization in Britain, but, as long as Scotland defends its cause resolutely externally and develops suitable distributive politics internally, such an era is unlikely. Success for Scotland now depends on how well it plays politics, both within and without, and how wisely it melds its national distinctiveness and internal diversity of place.

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