

NATIONALISMS AND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

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There are many nationalisms in contemporary British society. There is the official nationalism of the British state, a nationalism that internally seeks to maintain the unity of the United Kingdom (or perhaps more limitedly of Great Britain), and externally seeks to protect what is conceived of as British interests abroad (Kellas 1991). How British interests are construed depends on the particular incumbent guardians of British interests, namely the governing party, and there are certainly differences in how Conservative and Labour governments define the national interest vis-a-vis Europe or America. But official nationalism, of whatever political complexion, nonetheless talks about British interests.

Contrasting with the official nationalism of the British state, we have various specific Welsh, Scottish and Irish nationalisms. Internally, these nationalisms seek to secure some degree of constitutional change that will to a greater or lesser extent move the control of Welsh, Scottish or Irish affairs out of the hands of the central British state and give it to the representatives of the Welsh, Scottish or Irish nations. Externally, these nationalisms have tended to talk of specifically national rather than British interests abroad.

However, official British nationalism and specifically Scottish or Welsh nationalism are not necessarily either/or contrasts. One of the most evident characteristics of nationalisms in Britain is the coexistence of dual conceptions of national identity. People can feel both British and Welsh, or British and Scottish, or indeed both British and English (although it is

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questionable how far English people really distinguish between the latter two and they often appear to use the terms interchangeably, as indeed does the state when it terms the British state bank the 'Bank of England').

In Britain, then, we tend to have dual identities, combining a 'state' or 'supranational' identity as British with an 'ethnonational' identity as Welsh, Scottish or English. The latter is nested within the former and is not necessarily in an antagonistic relation with it. However, this situation of a hierarchy of nested identities is not the only possible one. A second possibility is that people are 'caught between' two identities and have an ambiguous relation with both. This has been described for first-generation migrants who are caught between the cultures of their countries of origin and destination and yet do not feel fully part of either. (But we might expect the situation for second-generation migrants to move perhaps to the 'nested' model of feeling both Black and British and preliminary results from the study of ethnic minority voting in Britain suggest that this is indeed largely the case.)

And the third possibility is that the two identities are seen as mutually exclusive alternatives rather than as a nested hierarchy. Irish identity may be thought of as an alternative to a British identity; Irish ethnonationalism is antagonistic to the British state and instead seeks to unify the Irish ethnic nation in a single Irish state. This perhaps is the kind of conception that Gellner had in mind when he described nationalism as

primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind
(Gellner 1983, p.1)

The nationalist movement, in this conception, aims to establish a separate state and thus to supplant the current official nationalism.

The central questions that we tackle in this paper are how British citizens themselves conceive of their national identities and whether they adopt multiple or exclusive conceptions. We then ask how people who adopt multiple and exclusive categories - exclusively British, dual identity, and exclusively Scottish/Welsh/English - feel about aspects of British

constitutional arrangements¹. In particular, do we find that there is a significant group who reject a British identity and for whom the British state has no legitimacy?

DUAL AND EXCLUSIVE IDENTITIES

We use the 1997 British Election and Scottish Election surveys². The surveys included the question that Moreno devised to identify exclusive and dual identities in Scotland (Moreno 1988). Thus respondents in Scotland were asked:

Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?

Scottish not British

More Scottish than British

Equally Scottish and British

More British than Scottish,

British not Scottish

Other

Analogous questions comparing Welsh and British identity were asked of respondents in Wales, and ones comparing English and British identity of respondents in England. Table 1 gives the distributions in the three countries.

¹ Note that there is an asymmetry here, the exclusively British in Scotland may of course have purely English ancestry and temporary Scottish residence. They may thus also share the 'multiple identity' conception but see themselves as Lancastrian Britains or West-country Britains rather than as Scottish Britons.

² These studies were funded by the ESRC with grants to the British team (Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, John Curtice and Pippa Norris) and the Scottish team (David McCrone, Alice Brown and Paula Surridge). The samples are nationally-representative probability samples and the interviews were conducted immediately after the 1997 general election. The achieved sample size was 3615 for the BES as a whole, which includes 882 cases in Scotland. The data, together with documentation and detailed description of the methodology, will be deposited at the ESRC Data Archive in April 1998.

Table 1
Distributions of single and multiple national identities
(column percentages)

	country of residence		
	England	Wales	Scotland
English/Welsh/Scottish not British	8	13	23
More English/Welsh/Scottish than British	16	29	39
Equally English/Welsh/Scottish and British	46	26	26
More British than English/Welsh/Scottish	15	10	4
British not English/Welsh/Scottish	9	15	4
Other description	5	4	3
None of the above	1	2	1
	100	99	100
<i>N</i>	<i>2551</i>	<i>182</i>	<i>882</i>

The distributions in the three countries are very different. Scotland has the highest proportion with an exclusive national identity (23%) while England has the lowest (8% exclusively English plus 9% exclusively British). In England the modal category is 'equally English and British' (46%) while both in Wales and in Scotland the modal category is 'more Welsh/Scottish than British'. Wales is also interesting for being more polarized, with the 13% of exclusive Welsh matched by 15% of exclusive British at the other end of the scale. Nevertheless, the great majority of respondents in all three countries

accept dual identities (77% in total in England, 65% in Wales and 69% in Scotland)¹.

Table 2
National identity and attitudes towards British citizenship
% agreeing that they would rather be a citizen of Britain

	country of residence		
	England	Wales	Scotland
English/Welsh/Scottish not British	76	83	73
More English/Welsh/Scottish than British	81	85	78
Equally English/Welsh/Scottish and British	83	83	86
More British than English/Welsh/Scottish	82	79	72
British not English/Welsh/Scottish	72	89	74
Other/none	41	-	-
All	78	81	78

These results are in line with previous research on national identities in Britain. What, however, is the significance of membership of the different categories of the Moreno scale? Do they tell us anything fundamental about people's self-conceptions and feelings, or are they more superficial? To explore this we begin by comparing their responses to an item designed to measure British national sentiment (Heath et al forthcoming). We asked respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statement

¹ Some very similar patterns have been found in earlier research conducted for The Rowntree Reform Trust (McCrone 1997). However, the Rowntree data show rather higher levels of exclusive identity in all three countries.

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(the response codes for each item ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree):

I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world.

Table 2 shows that the 'exclusive' Scots were indeed somewhat less likely than were the people with equal Scottish and British identities to say that they would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world, but the difference is relatively small. These results do not suggest that there is a strongly antagonistic relationship between an exclusive identity and a dual identity. The 73% of exclusive Scots who said they would rather be a citizen of Britain contrast with the 41% of the 'other/none' category who gave this answer. And if we unpick this latter category, we find that fewer than 20% of respondents who were resident in England but were actually citizens of another state (such as Ireland) would prefer to be citizens of Britain.

To be sure, Scots do not at present have the option of being citizens of a Scottish state, and if the question had been posed in terms of a choice between citizenship in a British or in a Scottish state, it is highly unlikely that 73% would have preferred Britain in the way that they did in table 2. Nevertheless, as things stand at present, these data suggest that the British state can command a considerable degree of legitimacy among its citizens.

Another important aspect of table 2 is that the British state appears to command very similar levels of support among the people with equal Scottish/British, Welsh/British and English/British identities (the figures being 86%, 83% and 83% respectively). There does not seem to be any systematic variation between countries in this respect (although the greater proportion of Scottish residents with exclusive Scottish or 'more Scottish than British' identities means that the overall level of support in Scotland is somewhat lower than that in Wales or England.)

Finally, we find a rather curious set of results for the people who define themselves as British not English, Welsh or Scots. In England and Wales, these people were slightly less inclined to say that they would rather be a citizen of Britain (72% and 74% respectively), whereas in Wales they were rather more inclined to express British sympathy. The numbers involved are rather small, and so we must be cautious, but one interpretation is that the meaning of 'Britishness' is itself variable, depending on social context. Thus in Wales it may be a way of signifying that one is not Welsh; it may be in part a reaction against Welsh identity and the Welsh nationalism of Plaid Cymru. In England, in contrast, the meaning of Britishness may be defined in relation

to Englishness and it may therefore be a reaction to the perceived parochialism of English national identity. In this way, an assertion of an exclusively British identity may be a statement of a more cosmopolitan identity.

These interpretations are necessarily somewhat speculative, but it is clear that dual identity is compatible with a high level of commitment to Britain, while an exclusive Scots or Welsh identity appears to reflect at most an ambivalence towards rather than an outright rejection of the British state.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CONSTITUTION

We now turn to consider whether different types of identity are related to constitutional preferences. Here it is useful to distinguish between internal and external aspects of nationalism. On the external side we might expect nationalism to translate into a reluctance to yield any sovereignty to Europe, while on the internal side we might expect nationalists to seek a greater measure of devolution and independence. A particularly interesting question, however, is whether these general expectations apply to all groups of exclusive nationalists alike. For example, we might expect that British and English nationalists would be more concerned about loss of sovereignty in Europe than would Welsh or Scottish nationalists (for whom a Europe of regions might be rather attractive, offering a counterbalance to English hegemony). Conversely, we might expect exclusive English to hold rather British attitudes towards the breakup of the UK.

The 1997 survey contained a number of relevant questions on Britain's relation to Europe, to the Northern Ireland question, and to Scottish and Welsh devolution. The questions we use on Europe and on Ireland are:

Do you think Britain's long-term policy should be to leave the European Union?

Do you think the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be for it ...

to remain part of the United Kingdom

or, to reunify with the rest of Ireland

On Wales and Scotland respondents were offered the following five options. We group the first two options together to give us our measure of preference for independence.

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Scotland/Wales should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union

Scotland/Wales should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union

Scotland/Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament/assembly which has some taxation powers

Scotland/Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament/assembly which has no taxation powers

Scotland/Wales should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament/assembly.

Table 3a shows the results when we cross-tabulate national identity by attitudes to these items on constitutional change. (For simplicity, we group together in a single category all respondents who felt they had a dual identity; i.e. a dual Scottish/British identity includes respondents who said they felt more Scottish than British or more British than Scottish as well as those who said they were equally Scottish and British).

What we see is that respondents with exclusive British identity tend to be very close to the dual-identity English/British and in general are quite close to the other dual-identity groups. As a whole these groups tend to be closer than the 'exclusives' to what might be thought of as the 'official' British line on these issues. Thus the exclusive British, like the dual-identity respondents, are relatively less likely to support withdrawal from the EU; they are relatively less likely to support the break-up of the UK either through reunifying Northern Ireland with the Republic or through granting independence to Scotland and Wales.

In contrast, people with exclusive identities are invariably more opposed to the official line than are their compatriots with dual identities. This is shown in table 3b, where we compute the differences between the exclusive and the dual-identity respondents. For example, 19% of the exclusive Scots felt that Britain should leave the EU compared with 10% of dual-identity Scottish/British, giving a difference of 9 points.

In every case we find that the exclusives are more inclined than the people with dual identity to take the 'unofficial' line. The differences are all quite small but the pattern is highly consistent and applies as much to the English nationalists as to the Scots or Welsh. Thus the 'official' British line is to remain part of the EU, but the exclusive Scots, Welsh and English are all

somewhat more inclined to leave than are the British or people with dual identity. Similarly with reunification of Ireland: the exclusives are more inclined to let Northern Ireland go rather than keep it part of the UK. Some

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Table 3a
Attitudes to Constitutional Change

	% agreeing that			
	Britain should leave EU	Reunify Ireland	Scotland should become independent	Wales should become independent
Exclusive national identity				
Scottish	19	59	44	na
Welsh	17	50	29	21
English	27	57	20	21
British	14	50	14	11
Dual national identity				
Scottish/British	10	44	21	na
Welsh/British	12	38	8	8
English/British	17	51	13	12

Table 3b
Differences between respondents with exclusive and dual national identities in their attitudes to Constitutional Change

	Britain should leave EU	Reunify Ireland	Scotland should become independent	Wales should become independent
Scottish	+9	+15	+23	na
Welsh	+5	+12	+21	+13
English	+10	+6	+7	+9

Note: calculated by subtracting the percentage in the lower panel of table 3a from the corresponding figure in the higher panel.

of the biggest differences occur with independence for Scotland, and here it is notable that the exclusive English, while unenthusiastic about independence, are still more willing to grant it than are the British.

Thus in these constitutional respects the exclusive English are indeed somewhat more likely to deviate from the official British nationalism. This is counter to our original expectation, where we had anticipated that the exclusive English might adopt a more British view. To be sure, we find that the English, whether of dual or exclusive identity, are unenthusiastic about independence for Scotland (with only 20% of exclusive English and 13% of English/British supporting independence), but the difference between the exclusive and dual identity English is, at +7 points, in exactly the same direction as that for Scots and Welsh.

Similarly, we had expected the Scots and Welsh to be somewhat more prone to support the EU, and indeed there is a general tendency for this to be true for the Scots or Welsh as a whole (only 10% of Scots/British compared with 17% of English/British supporting withdrawal). But the gap between the exclusive and dual identity Scots is in exactly the same direction as that between the exclusive and dual identity English.

So what we seem to have uncovered is that there are common processes occurring for all three exclusive nationalisms. There appear to be common features that apply to Scots, Welsh and English nationalists alike.

We can explore this idea further by examining attitudes towards the workings of British democracy. We might anticipate that people with exclusive national identities would feel less allegiance to the British state and that it would have less legitimacy in their eyes. How far is this true, and does it apply to the exclusive English as much as to the exclusive Scots and Welsh?

We have four items which broadly speaking tap attitudes towards British democracy. (They can all be thought of as measuring, in various ways, perceived 'system efficacy'.) The items are:

Some people say that political parties care what ordinary people think.

Others say that political parties in Britain don't care what ordinary people think. Using this scale where would you place yourself?

How much do you trust British governments of any party to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their own political party?

just about always,

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most of the time,

only some of the time,

almost never

On the whole how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Britain? Are you

satisfied

fairly satisfied

not very satisfied

or not at all satisfied?

Which of these statements best describes your opinion on the present system of governing Britain?

Works extremely well and could not be improved

Could be improved in small ways but mainly works well

Could be improved quite a lot

Needs a great deal of improvement

For the first item, respondents were offered five (unlabelled) response codes, and we group together the two most negative. For the other three items we also group together the two most negative response codes, thus giving measures of how alienated people feel from British democracy.

Table 4a shows that, in every case but one, people with exclusive national identities are more alienated than those with a dual identity. (The one exception is trust in government, where all the differences are rather small anyway.) Once again, the exclusively British are almost identical to the dual English/British respondents and are relatively satisfied with the workings of British democracy, as indeed befits their central place in the working of the system. Scots and Welsh with dual identities are also very close to the English/British and show almost equal levels of satisfaction.

As table 4b shows, however, there are some major gaps between the respondents with exclusive identities and their compatriots with dual identities. The gaps are much the smallest in the case of the English, are rather larger with the Scots, and are greatest of all for the Welsh. If we

Table 4a
Feelings about system of government and democracy in Britain

	% feeling that			
	parties do not care	rarely trust British government	not satisfied with British democracy	system needs a lot of improvement
Exclusive national identity				
Scottish	36	73	44	53
Welsh	53	71	71	67
English	29	69	25	47
British	26	63	23	40
Dual national identity				
Scottish/British	22	67	28	45
Welsh/British	24	73	27	39
English/British	23	63	22	40

Table 4b
Differences between respondents with exclusive and dual national identities in their feelings about democracy and government

	parties do not care	rarely trust British government	not satisfied with British democracy	system needs a lot of improvement
Scottish	+14	+6	+16	+8
Welsh	+29	-2	+44	+28
English	+6	+6	+3	+7

Note: calculated by subtracting the percentage in the lower panel of table 4a from the corresponding figure in the higher panel.

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construct a single scale of dissatisfaction with democracy from these four items, we find that the exclusive Scots score 6.0 compared with 5.4 for dual-identity Scots; the exclusive Welsh score 6.3 compared with 5.3 for dual-identity Welsh, while the exclusive English score 5.6 compared with 5.3 for the dual-identity English. (In each case the difference between the single and dual-identity respondents is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.) Once again it is striking how similar the dual-identity respondents are in all three countries, while the exclusively Welsh appear to be the most alienated¹.

SOCIAL PROFILE

There do, then, appear to be some systematic attitudinal differences between people with exclusive identities and those with dual identities in all three countries alike. We might accordingly expect to see some parallels in their social characteristics too. We explore this in table 5a. We distinguish people according to their age (simply dichotomizing the variable to give two groups, those aged forty and over and those aged under forty); social class (distinguishing the working class, defined as Socio-Economic Groups 8,9,10 and 11, from all other classes); religiosity (respondents were asked 'would you say that nowadays you are very religious, somewhat religious, not very religious, or not at all religious' and we dichotomise responses distinguishing the 'not at all religious' from all other groups); denomination, where we distinguish members of the established church (Church of Scotland north of the border or Church of England/Episcopal in England and Wales), and

¹ See table A1. We sum the responses to the four items described above, but using the original response codes, rather than the dichotomised versions used in table 5. We also assign 'don't knows' to the modal categories. Since the variable PTYCARE has five categories rather than the four of the other variables, this in effect gives it slightly more weight in the Likert scale, but the alternative method of using factor scores produces almost identical answers. As with the scale of British nationalism, we have rescored the Likert scale so that it runs from 1 to 10. In England and Wales this four-item scale has Cronbach's alpha of 0.59 and in Scotland alpha is 0.53. Note however that three of the four items are worded in a positive direction, while in the other item the positive alternative is offered first. Unlike the scale of British national sentiment, therefore, this scale of satisfaction with democracy is not a balanced one and will suffer from acquiescence bias. This is likely to inflate Cronbach's alpha, due to correlated errors, and might also lead to stronger associations with variables such as education.

Table 5a
Demographic profile of national groups (%)

	under 40	working class	not religious	left school at 15	member of established church
Exclusive national identity					
Scottish	51	44	38	45	37
Welsh	42	46	42	50	29
English	29	40	33	52	48
British	34	26	25	27	25
Dual national identity					
Scottish/British	36	34	24	45	46
Welsh/British	36	34	39	43	28
English/British	37	28	27	39	45

Table 5b
**Differences in the demographic profile of respondents with exclusive and dual
national identity**

	under 40	working class	not religious	left school at 15	member of established church
Scottish	+15	+10	+14	=	-9
Welsh	+6	+12	+3	+7	+1
English	-8	+12	+6	+13	+3

Note: calculated by subtracting the percentage in the lower panel of table 5a from the corresponding figure in the higher panel.

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educational level (distinguishing those who left full-time education at age fifteen or earlier)¹.

As with political attitudes we see a tendency for the 'exclusives' to be somewhat deviant from the dominant British institutions associated with official nationalism. Thus they are more likely than their 'dual' counterparts to be working class, to have left school early, to be non-religious, and to be young. In Scotland they are also less likely to be members of the established Church of Scotland. The exclusively British (and the English/British) in contrast are the least likely to be working class, the most likely to be highly-educated, and among the most likely to be religious.

Once again the exclusively English fit into this general pattern of membership of subordinate groups. As table 5b shows, the gaps are, with the exception of age and church membership, in the same direction as those for the exclusively Scots and Welsh. The exception of age is, however, quite instructive. The fact that in Scotland exclusive national identity is more common among the young whereas in England it is more likely among older respondents strongly suggests that nationalism is a generational phenomenon rather than a life-cycle one.

It is also notable that the exclusively Scottish are no less educated than their dual-identity compatriots. However, this may in part be a consequence of their relative youth: the school-leaving age (and staying-on rates generally) has been higher for younger cohorts, and thus age may tend to mask the effects of education. (Conversely, the lower educational level of the exclusively English may be in part a reflection of their older age profile.) Similarly, church membership varies by age. If we carry out a multivariate analysis we find that the effects of education and church membership on national identity are in fact very similar in the three countries.

The natural question then arises whether the differences in political attitudes which we found earlier (in tables 3 and 4) are simply consequences of the social profile of exclusive nationalists. Thus we might well expect that people

¹ We also asked a question about language, and as expected the results suggested that an exclusive Welsh identity was associated with the Welsh language, but the numbers of Welsh language speakers was too small to make any reliable statements. We also found some bivariate differences according to length of residence in the current neighbourhood, but in a multivariate analysis it appeared that length of residence had no independent explanatory force.

who are in subordinate positions in the social structure would also be more alienated from the dominant institutions, and it could well be their social position rather than their national identity per se that accounts for their alienation. Does an exclusive identity therefore have any autonomous role, over and above the effects of class, age, education and religion?

To answer this question we carry out a multivariate analysis, in which our dependent variable is the scale of dissatisfaction with British democracy described earlier. We regress this (using linear regression) on the five social variables plus identity¹. We distinguish, as before, simply between people with an exclusive identity and those with a dual identity. We run separate regressions for each country (although in later work we plan to carry out a pooled analysis). Table 6 shows the results.

Table 6
Regression of dis-satisfaction with British democracy

	Country of residence		
	England	Wales	Scotland
Exclusive identity	0.29**	0.95**	0.38**
Working class	0.20**	0.32	0.16
Under 40 years old	0.15*	0.16	0.12
Religiosity	0.06	0.03	0.20**
Member of established church	-0.12*	-0.28	-0.30**
Years of education	-0.03**	-0.03	-0.04*
Constant	5.5	5.6	5.6
<i>N</i>	<i>1739</i>	<i>111</i>	<i>641</i>

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 6 shows clearly that an exclusive identity does have, in all three countries alike, a significant autonomous impact on dissatisfaction, even after controlling for the structural variables. The effect appears to be somewhat

¹ For the multiple regression we continue to treat age and class as dichotomous variables, but we treat education and religiosity as continuous variables.

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larger in Wales, although with the small sample size in Wales we should be wary of drawing any strong conclusions.

In general however, it is striking how similar the processes are in all three countries. Note in particular that age has the same kind of effect on alienation in England as it does in Wales and Scotland and it may be that this effect, unlike its effect on identity, has more of a life-cycle character. (For further discussion of age and life cycle effects on social and political attitudes see Heath and Park 1997.) Likewise, membership of the established church, educational level, and social class all have rather similar effects in the three regressions. The sources of dis-satisfaction with government and democracy are remarkably similar in England, Wales and Scotland.

CONCLUSIONS

People with dual identities are relatively close to official British nationalism. The conception of multiple, nested identities where a sense of, for example, Scottishness is compatible with a sense of Britishness is clearly appropriate here. A dual identity is clearly compatible with a high level of legitimacy for the British state, and even an exclusive identity does not, at least under the present constitutional arrangements, seem to involve any great antagonism to the British state.

However, our data show that exclusive national identities are associated with subordinate positions in the social structure and with somewhat greater alienation from the workings of British democracy. People with exclusive national identities deviate from their compatriots with dual identities both in their attitudes towards constitutional issues and in their satisfaction with democracy in Britain.

There appear to be striking similarities in the processes in all three countries, In this sense Scottish and Welsh nationalism have many parallels with English nationalism. Although, as we have seen, there are major differences in the proportions in each country, with Scotland having a distinctively higher proportion of people with exclusive identities, the effect of an exclusive identity seems to work in the same direction in England as in Scotland and Wales.

But while the 'exclusives' are deviant, they are not at present strongly oppositional. The differences are generally small, and lie in between attitudes of, for example, the Irish or of non-citizens. It cannot be said that there is, at present, a major threat to official nationalism. However, future trends are likely to be contingent on the relations between the incumbent government of

the British state in Westminster and Scottish aspirations. Conservative intransigence might well have strengthened aspirations for independence and exclusive conceptions of identity. Conversely, Labour's establishment of a Scottish parliament may, by meeting Scottish aspirations, limit the rise of exclusive identities. Experience in Catalonia suggests that the devolution of 1979 was successful in maintaining dual Spanish/Catalonian identities.

In contrast, the polarization of national identities in Wales, and the much more limited devolution on offer there, may make it much harder to satisfy the (divergent) aspirations. As we have argued in this paper, feelings of national identity and the associated sentiments are likely to be contingent on the social and political context. The new political contexts that the next few years will bring can be expected to lead to a further evolution of national identity in all three countries.

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Table A1
Scores on the dissatisfaction with British democracy scale

	country of residence		
	England	Wales	Scotland
English/Welsh/Scottish not British	5.6	6.3	6.0
More English/Welsh/Scottish than British	5.3	5.5	5.5
Equally English/Welsh/Scottish and British	5.3	5.2	5.3
More British than English/Welsh/Scottish	5.2	5.0	5.3
British not English/Welsh/Scottish	5.4	5.1	5.3
Other/none	5.8	6.5	5.4
All	5.3	5.5	5.6
